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Glossary of terms 
Additionality 
Additionality is defined as the extent to which government-funded training generates 
outcomes that are additional to what would have occurred in the absence of such provision 
(HM Treasury, 2011, pp. 59). 
Co-funding 
Co-funding is broadly defined as shared Government, employer and individual co-
investment in the total costs of training. The scope of this study considers only the actual 
expenditure by employers to finance training supported in part by public funds. This 
includes all direct costs incurred by the employer in training new and existing staff, 
including the fees and payments to external providers and those associated with internal 
training provision. 
Continuing vocational training 
Continuing vocational training (CVT) refers to education or training taken by individuals 
who have exited initial education and training or after they have entered employment. 
Deadweight 
Deadweight is defined as the extent to which the government policy generates outcomes 
that would have occurred anyway (HM Treasury, 2011, pp. 59). 
Displacement effects 
Displacement relates to instances where the positive outcomes promoted by government 
policy are offset by negative outcomes of the same policy elsewhere (HM Treasury, 2011, 
pp. 59). 
Endogeneity 
An endogenous variable is one that is related to and determined by other variables also in 
the model. Training decisions can be endogenous for two reasons: on the one hand, there 
can be unobservable characteristics, such as managerial quality and attitudes that 
determine both training and socio-economic outcomes. On the other hand, training may be 
a choice variable, so that idiosyncratic shocks at firm or industry level affect both training 
decisions and outcomes such as productivity (Colombo and Stanca, 2008). 
Externalities and spillovers  
For the purposes of this report, these interchangeable terms refer to benefits to society 
(with respect to incentives to invest in training) that cannot be captured by private actors in 
the market. For example, when employers help workers acquire skills and knowledge that 
9 
Final Report: International Evidence Review on Co-funding for Training 
 
are potentially transferable to other workplaces, it is difficult for the employer to capture all 
of the benefits of training, since the worker may choose to switch employers. 
Formal education and training  
Formal education is defined as education provided in the system of schools, colleges, 
universities and other formal educational institutions and that normally constitutes a 
continuous ladder of full-time education (OECD, 2005, pp. 319-320). 
Grant payment 
Grant payments are direct government funding for the purpose of training, which may also 
be channelled through training funds. 
Initial vocational training 
Initial vocational training (IVT) generally refers to the initial preparation of new entrants to 
the labour market (young people) with skills and competences to gain entry into a specific 
occupation or sector (Cedefop, 2008b). 
Job-related training 
The term ‘job-related’ refers to training activities intended mainly for professional reason as 
opposed to mainly personal or social reasons. That is, the respondent takes part in the 
activity in order to obtain knowledge and/or learn new skills for a current or future job, 
increase earnings, improve job and/or career opportunities and generally improve his or 
her opportunities for advancement or promotion (OECD, 2005, pp. 320). 
Leakage 
The policy benefits others outside the target area or group (HM Treasury, 2011, pp. 59). 
Levy-access 
Employers contributing to the levy scheme have access to training developed or procured 
by the managing body at discounted rates. 
Levy-exemption 
Sanction or tax on firms if they do not meet a pre-determined level of training provision. 
Levy-grant 
Employers pay a non-voluntary contribution to a training fund which is then disbursed to 
training firms. 
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Levy-reimbursement  
Employers pay a non-voluntary contribution to a training fund which is then used to 
reimburse the costs of training. 
Lifelong learning  
Lifelong learning relates to the on-going access to the renewing of skills and the 
acquisition of knowledge. This covers ‘all learning activity undertaken throughout life, with 
the aim of improving knowledge, skills and competence, within a personal, civic, social 
and/or employment-related perspective’ (European Commission, 2001, pp.34). 
Non-formal education/training  
Non-formal education is defined as any organised and sustained educational activities that 
do not correspond exactly to the above definition of formal education. Non-formal 
education may therefore take place both within and outside educational institutions, and 
cater to persons of any age. Depending on country contexts, it may cover educational 
programmes to impart adult literacy, basic education for out-of-school children, life skills, 
work skills and general culture. Non-formal education programmes do not necessarily 
follow the ladder system, and may have a differing duration (OECD, 2005, pp. 319-320). 
Skills 
The relevant knowledge and experience needed to perform a specific task or job and/or 
the product of education, training and experience which, together with relevant know-how, 
is the characteristic of technical knowledge (Cedefop, 2007). 
Skill gap 
A skill gap refers to a situation in which the level of skills of the currently employed is less 
than that required in order to adequately perform the job or to a situation in which the type 
of skill does not match the requirements of the job (Cedefop, 2010, pp.13). 
Skill shortage 
Skills shortages refer to a situation in which the demand for a particular type of skill 
exceeds the supply of available people with that skill (Cedefop, 2010, pp.13). 
SMEs  
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may be defined differently in different 
jurisdictions. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), SMEs are non-subsidiary, independent firms which employ less than a given 
number of employees. This number varies across countries. The most frequent upper limit 
designating an SME is 250 employees, as in the European Union. Small firms are 
generally those with fewer than 50 employees, while micro-enterprises have 10 workers at 
most. 
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Social partners 
‘Social partners’ is a collective term used to refer to organisations representing workers 
and employers such as trade unions and employer associations. 
Substitution 
Substitution arises when the effects of an intervention on a particular individual, group or 
area are only realised at the expense of other individuals, groups or areas (HM Treasury, 
2011, pp. 59). 
Tax allowance 
Deduction of a certain sum or fraction of the costs of training investment from taxable 
profits, over and above the standard deductibility of training costs. 
Tax credit (refundable or non-wastable) 
Deduction of a certain sum or fraction of a training investment from the tax liability, which 
entitles the employer to a payment if the tax relief reduces the amount of tax owed to less 
than zero. 
Tax credit (wastable or non-refundable) 
Deduction of a certain sum or fraction of a training investment from the tax liability, which 
is unable to reduce the amount of tax owed to less than zero. 
Tax exemption 
Employer social security contributions on trainees/apprentices are exempted from the tax 
base. 
Tax reduction 
Employer social security contributions on trainees/apprentices are taxed at a lower rate 
than those on other employees. 
Training firms 
A training firm is an enterprise that provided any form of training to its employees in a 
given reference period.  
Training voucher 
Training vouchers are a form of direct subsidy, and can be exchanged for a certain amount 
or a certain value of training. 
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Executive summary 
Greater employer and business investment in training is vital to ensure the training 
delivered by the Further Education (FE) and skills system in England is high quality and 
responsive to economic need. Striking the right balance in sharing the costs of vocational 
training between Government, employers and individuals is however a complex issue. 
In view of the ongoing process of FE and skills training reform, ICF GHK was 
commissioned by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) to undertake 
an international review of evidence on the use of employer-routed, co-funding instruments 
for training. The review identifies and examines the effects of different co-funding 
instruments and delivery models on the amount and quality of provision undertaken by 
employers, and considers the impacts this has on the wider skills training system.  
None of the identified co-funding models are identical to the type of co-funding model that 
could be deduced from recent reviews and policy statements, for example, the Richard 
Review and the Government’s response to it. However, in keeping with such intentions, all 
are aimed at increasing employer investment in appropriate and high quality FE and skills 
training in order to increase workplace productivity and thereby international 
competitiveness. 
Key policy lessons 
This section is based on an assessment of evidence from a number of sources:  English 
and international policy documents and research; interviews with co-funding and 
behavioural policy experts; as well as in-depth qualitative case studies (interviews and 
evidence review) of the Australian Apprenticeship Incentive, the Irish Skillnets Training 
Network, and the Dutch Payment Reduction for Education programmes.   
The main conclusion which emerges from an extensive review of the evidence is that the 
relationship between different models of co-funding and training outcomes is extremely 
complex and dynamic. 
The complex nature of the relationship stems in part from the wide variety of influencing 
institutional, economic and personal factors that need to be taken into account. There is 
also great diversity in the design of different models, the delivery mechanisms and 
attached conditions. These are also often revised over time.  
The variety of tax expenditures, subsidies and levy-grant mechanisms adopted are 
fundamentally similar, insofar as they route government funding through employers. The 
extent to which their impacts differ is more often guided by the context in which they are 
delivered and the detail of specific conditions attached.  
The need for consideration of the wider context in which a co-funding incentive operates is 
a theme that recurs throughout the research, and was emphasised by all of the experts 
consulted. In particular, three key findings emerge: 
13 
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 The behavioural context. Institutional and personal factors have a stronger influence 
than financial incentives on the take-up and completion of training. The uptake of co-
funding instruments and employer co-investment in training are particularly influenced 
by perceptions of the benefits and effectiveness of training. To reflect the differentiated 
attitudes to training, concerted efforts should be taken to develop understanding of 
where the benefits for training lie and communicate the benefits of training to the actors 
concerned.  
 The wider policy context. The emphasis of the research evidence presented in the 
paper suggests that a perceived focus only on the costs and funding mechanism for 
training is insufficient. Instead there is a need to place greater emphasis on the benefits 
of training, and consider the full range of mechanisms to encourage more employers to 
invest in high quality training for more of their workers. The financial incentives for 
employer investment in training cannot be isolated from the wider topography of skills 
policies and programmes. 
 Employer ‘buy-in’. In addition, whichever delivery mechanism is adopted, employer 
‘buy-in’ is vital. The acceptance for a given scheme and the corresponding willingness 
to invest time and money in it has an important influence on the amount, 
responsiveness and relevance of training, irrespective of the design of the co-funding 
model. The evidence suggests that employer ‘buy-in’ can be developed over time based 
on positive experiences and perceptions of training. Co-funding mechanisms, such as 
the Skillnets model in Ireland, that support the development of training plans and 
include an active role for different stakeholders may lead to improved attitudes towards 
training through peer-learning or network effects. Involvement of stakeholders, including 
employer representatives and trade unions at industry or local level, can also help to 
generate and maintain employer and industry ‘buy-in’. Such support is likely to be 
particularly important with employers or sectors that have limited experience of training. 
The review of international evidence also raises several key issues for the implementation 
of co-funding mechanisms. These are: 
 Aims and objectives. It is important to be clear about which aspects of learning and 
skills behaviour the employer-routed incentive is seeking to change. The co-funding 
models investigated are concerned with a wide variety of considerations including 
participation, equity, training quality, levels of attainment, increasing absolute levels of 
employer investment, increasing the incidence of employer investment, creating a 
responsive provider system, and more often than not, a combination of these. The 
greater the number of aims and objectives, the more complex the system is. This 
relationship between complexity and the range of competing objectives is common to all 
of the co-funding models investigated, and exemplified by the Australian model. 
 The difficulty of targeting incentives. Little or no impact of incentives for employer co-
investment on the low qualified is observed, even where these are the explicit targets of 
direct funding. Instead, co-funding incentives tend to support the training of workers and 
new entrants already bearing qualifications. In situations where incentives are instead 
targeted at particular types of qualification or training, or at particular age groups, this 
often leads to unintended consequences as firm’s decisions on the type of training to 
14 
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follow, and for which individuals, are distorted by the incentive. The more that incentives 
are targeted the greater are the monitoring requirements to ensure that the aims and 
objectives are met. Loose eligibility criteria, on the other hand, have the benefit of 
making the incentive accessible to businesses but the disadvantages of not promoting 
improvements in the quality of training and incurring higher levels of deadweight.  
 The costs of administration borne by employers. A high administrative burden is a 
direct result of instruments with more rigorous quality controls and/or which are highly 
targeted. The complexity of the administrative procedures for accessing funding 
discourages take-up amongst firms. In particular, instances of discretionary case-by-
case assessment of funding applications or requirements to submit formal training plans 
tend to favour employers that provide training for their employees. Evidence from 
Australia and Ireland suggests that the engagement of employer networks or group 
training organisations to act as intermediaries can offset this effect and support smaller 
firms in particular. The use of the existing tax infrastructure to raise or distribute funds 
may also relieve the employer of administrative costs. Efficient use of the tax system is, 
however, conditional on the ability of the tax system to control and sufficiently monitor 
compliance. The international evidence, and the example of the tax credit for training in 
the Netherlands, suggests that such monitoring is time-consuming, costly and ultimately 
difficult to achieve. 
 Monitoring and financial controls. Incentive and co-funding systems administered 
through the tax system (and thereby the tax authorities) can lack effective financial 
controls on the extent of the public contribution. Furthermore, the level and nature of the 
investment in learning and skills, by the employer and the Government, can also 
become ‘invisible’ because it is recorded simply as a tax exemption rather than an 
investment in workforce development. For both reasons, it is important that the nature 
and level of employer and public co-investments are monitored.  
 Balancing trade-offs. All of the case study co-funding systems have met with varying 
types and degrees of success and failure. No single international system that has been 
reviewed in this study fits with all of the principles identified as underpinning co-funding 
reform in England. The lessons to be learnt are more about the efficacy and 
implementation of elements of these systems rather than applying another county’s 
entire system to an English context. The review has demonstrated that there trade-offs 
in levels of take-up, costs, levels of administration, targeting, quality, deadweight and 
other elements and balancing these trade-offs are ultimately political decisions.  
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1 Introduction and background 
ICF GHK was commissioned by the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) to undertake an international review of 
evidence on the use of employer-routed, co-funding instruments for 
training. The review collates and analyses evidence to consider the 
effects of different co-funding instruments and delivery models on the 
amount and quality of provision undertaken by employers, and the 
impacts on the wider skills training system.  
1.1 Research aims and objectives 
Striking the right balance in sharing the cost of Vocational Education and Training (VET) 
between government, employers and individuals (who pays how much, for what, when, 
where and how?) is a complex issue. This review explores the role of different approaches 
to co-funding by analysing the evidence of impact of international schemes to foster 
employer investment. 
The overall aim of the review is to establish the underlying evidence base for employer-
routed co-funding approaches to further education (FE) and skills training. To this end, this 
review sets out to identify evidence on international instruments of co-funding. Based on 
the available evidence, the review then proceeds to assess the following research 
questions: 
 What delivery models are used for co-funding? 
 What types of businesses and individuals are targeted, and for what types of training? 
 How does the level of employer awareness affect the take-up of co-funding incentives 
and the amount of job-related training? 
 What are the effects on the overall incidence, intensity and quality of training of the 
different co-funding instruments?  
 Do the co-funding models allocate resources efficiently and how is this affected by the 
conditions of support and the type of instrument used? 
 What are the deadweight or displacement effects of co-funding instruments? 
 Are there any substitution effects or other unintended consequences, which limit their 
effectiveness? 
 What are the revenue effects of the different co-funding policy instruments? In what 
ways can the fiscal liability be managed or controlled? 
16 
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 What are the impacts of the co-funding instruments on the returns to investment in 
additional training for employers, employees and the wider economy? 
 What lessons can be drawn from the international experience of co-funding policy 
instruments for the English context, and ongoing process of further education and 
training reform? 
The review is therefore interested in understanding the impact and effectiveness of funding 
models which embed co-funding by providing incentives for employers to invest in training. 
This contrasts with the current English approach, which primarily routes funding through 
training providers. The analysis contributes to other ongoing investigations into effective 
co-funding models and the benefits co-funding can bring to the FE and skills training 
system, to drive up quality and ensure provision meets demand. 
Developed countries face similar challenges in the realm of FE and skills training, and 
many different policy prescriptions have been sought to increase the responsiveness of 
training to labour market needs. Learning from other countries experiences can provide 
valuable support to policymaking in the UK. To this end the study investigates the 
evidence on the experience and performance of instruments in OECD countries that 
provide financial support (or penalties) to employers to promote investment in the training 
of new entrants (initial training) and/or existing workers (continuing training).1 Full 
methodological details outlining the scope of the international evidence review are 
provided in Appendix 1 to this report. 
1.2 Further education and skills training policy context 
From an international perspective, there is no single system delivering either initial (IVT) 
and continuing vocational training (CVT) in the UK, but rather a range of public, private 
and third sector organisations who deliver programmes both for adults and for young 
people (who have just completed their compulsory education) who wish to acquire or 
improve their existing skills after completing compulsory education and training. As a result 
of this, there is a significant crossover between the IVT and CVT systems as adults and 
new entrants to the labour market may pursue the same training. 
For education and training, the UK has a devolved system of governance, with each 
constituent country of the UK: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland with 
authority over the education and training system and skills development strategies. While 
similarities exist between these devolved education and training systems, there are also 
many differences (Cedefop, 2011a). England is the sole focus of this study. 
The post-16 FE and skills training system in England has become increasingly outcomes-
based. Training providers have flexibility to plan learner-centred delivery systems to meet 
                                            
1 Government incentives and financial support aimed at individual learners, or which fund provision directly 
are beyond the scope of this study. Non-financial incentives including regulatory approaches to: improve the 
training offer through processes for the accreditation of providers and certification of participants; guarantee 
individual rights to training; or contractual guarantees to extend the employer-employee relationship through 
payback clauses and training contracts, are also beyond the direct scope of this study.  
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users’ needs. The flexibility offered by the outcomes approach has been greatest in 
providing adult learners with access to individually targeted learning and assessment. 
Young people, increasingly since the renewal of National Apprenticeship programmes, 
tend to follow more standardised learning programmes. While much initial training is 
Government-funded, employer funding plays a significant role in providing in-company 
training or work-based learning delivered through specialist consultants or agencies 
(Cedefop, 2011a). 
The UK, as a whole, has a significantly larger proportion of adults in the labour force with 
low qualifications and a smaller proportion holding intermediate level qualifications than 
countries such as Sweden, Finland, the United States, and Germany (Falch and 
Oosterbeek, 2011). As Figure 1 below shows, in 2010 the UK had similar levels of adults 
with intermediate or high level qualifications as France, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
Figure 1: Share of labour force by level of qualifications in European countries2 
 
Source: 2010 data based on European labour force survey (Eurostat), extracted from 
Cedefop (2013) 
The incidence of work based training among employers in the UK is comparable to its 
international competitors, with above average rates of company take-up of continuing 
vocational training courses (60 per cent) in 2010. However, fewer than 1 in 3 employees 
                                            
2 Low qualifications correspond to ISCED levels 0-2, Intermediate qualifications to ISCED 3-4 and High 
qualifications to ISCED 5-8. An indicative mapping of the English education system against ISCED 2011 is 
provided in Appendix 3. 
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participate in such courses (31 per cent), which is below the estimated average rate of 
participation in the rest of the EU (38 per cent).3 
In addition, while rates of enrolment for CVT have been increasing, the UK has relatively 
low levels of employer provision of initial training. In 2010, only 18 per cent of employers 
provided IVT, such as apprenticeships (Cedefop, 2013), compared to an estimated EU 
average of 24 per cent. A lack of high quality training and a lack of workers with 
intermediate vocational qualifications, particularly at the early stages of career 
development, are seen as structural weaknesses affecting the UK’s competitiveness 
(UKCES, 2011).  
Reflecting a pattern widely observed across Europe and the other OECD countries, larger 
firms are much more likely to provide IVT or CVT than their small and medium-sized 
counterparts. The latest findings of the Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS) by 
firm size are provided in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Participation in vocational training in the UK and the EU 
Firm size 
Employers 
providing IVT 
courses, % 
Employers 
providing CVT 
courses, % 
Employee 
participation in 
CVT courses, % 
 UK EU UK EU UK EU
All 
enterprises 18 24 60 56 31 38
Small  
(10-49 
employees) 
15 22 56 52 25 25
Medium  
(50-249 
employees) 
25 31 76 73 28 34
Large  
(250+ 
employees) 
43 44 85 89 33 46
Source: Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS 4), 2010 
Further, while the proportion of training enterprises may be relatively high in the UK, 
particularly among larger firms, the quality of this training in terms of its duration, intensity, 
and whether the training leads to formal accreditation and certification is often criticised 
(see for example BIS, 2011b).  
                                            
3 Figures have been taken from the latest Continuing Vocational Training Survey, CVTS, 2010, available 
from Eurostat at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/education/data, accessed on 24/04/13. 
The aggregated EU figures represent official Eurostat estimates made in the absence of official data from 3 
of the 27 Member States: Denmark, Greece, and Ireland.  
19 
Final Report: International Evidence Review on Co-funding for Training 
 
As well as improving the quality of training, a further priority for English FE and skills 
training policy in recent years has been to widen participation from groups under-
represented in training, in particular learners from disadvantaged socioeconomic 
backgrounds and those with learning difficulties and/or disabilities.  
1.2.1 Barriers to training 
Employers, which are the primary focus of this study, face disincentives or barriers with 
respect to investing in FE and training. They may also be sceptical about or unaware of 
the benefits and cost effectiveness of training. 
Human capital theory suggests that firms are discouraged by the fear that they will not be 
able to benefit from the potential return from training due to staff turnover or poaching of 
employees by other employers - who may pay higher wages as they have not had to bear 
the costs of training (Stevens, 1996).  
There is however little evidence to support this theory. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
firms provide both general and specific training to their staff (Pouliakas, 2012) while the 
latest empirical evidence suggesting that only a small number of training establishments 
are found to be poaching-victims in Germany (Mohrenweiser et al. 2011). The lack of 
evidence notwithstanding, employer perceptions and concerns over this issue may reduce 
the perceived benefits of training and lead to under-investment in training. 
In a recession, and where there are high levels of unemployment, Cappelli (2012) 
suggests that changes in firm hiring practices exacerbate low levels of IVT, as firms 
replace recruitment strategies and the accompanying costs of investment in the skills of 
new recruits with just-in-time hiring of more qualified workers.  
Analysis of the National Employer Skills Survey (NESS) 2009 however, suggests that 
recession may not represent a significant barrier to employer investment in training. 
Despite the severity of the recession, the vast majority of employers in England reported 
that their training expenditure, its coverage and its character remained largely intact 
(Felstead et al. 2012). A minority of employers however reported to have cut spending on 
training from 2008 to 2009 (Mason and Bishop, 2010). Between 2009 and 2011 however, 
reported employer investment in training has decreased (UKCES, 2010 and 2012a).  
It has also been suggested that employers (and individuals) may be sceptical about the 
benefits of training or fail to recognise the benefits and the returns on investment when 
deciding how much to invest in training (Redding, 1996). While the costs of training are 
salient, the benefits to the firm and the wider industry are less apparent and less tangible, 
particularly among firms lacking direct experience of training. Training practices among 
employers, in this sense, may also be seen as a habit within those firms (BIS, 2012a).  
The over-riding emphasis on costs may be considered to be reinforced by standard 
accounting practices (in which training costs are deducted as costs rather than 
depreciated over time). Training, as a consequence, may be treated as operational costs 
rather than as an investment (Delsen, 2007), which again may reduce the take-up of 
training. 
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Employer investment in training may also be limited by other information constraints and 
asymmetries including: difficulties in identifying potential providers; evaluating what course 
content is required to meet occupational requirements, and; assessing the quality of the 
training offered by competing providers. Ritzen and Stern (1991) argue that improved 
information on the content and value of training will thereby improve the efficiency of the 
training market. 
Employers, and particularly Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), may also 
reduce staff training due to cash flow problems or issues over access to finance. In line 
with the observed differences in participation and uptake of training between small and 
larger firms, all of the barriers and disincentives to invest in training identified above tend 
to be greater for SMEs.  
Pouliakas (2012) cites other important deterrents to employer investment in training 
including the preference of firms to provide only limited training if they operate in seasonal 
markets; and the fact that enterprises in remote locations or newly emerging industries 
may face a shortage of suitable trainers as well as higher costs, which reduces the cost 
effectiveness of training. 
In light of these constraints, market failures and the identified public policy objectives of 
widening access to training, Governments tend to intervene by adopting a central role in 
bearing at least part of the directs costs of training. In particular, government funding may 
be considered necessary in order for the FE and skills system to deliver accredited training 
including both general and vocational elements (BIS, 2012a). 
Lin and Tremblay (2003) have however questioned the appropriateness of government 
intervention in CVT, since government is unlikely to be better informed than firms about 
the type of training needed by employers for their employees. In their report, they go 
further to say that empirical literature on the evaluation of public training programs (i.e. 
those directly funded by government) generally finds that such programs are not very 
effective at improving the skills of economically disadvantaged workers, and in meeting 
employer needs. Further involvement and co-investment by employers in training can help 
to ensure that the skills developed are in line with those needed in the workplace. 
1.2.2 What is co-funding? 
In the literature co-funding is typically defined broadly to consider the sharing of the total 
costs of training among public and private actors (typically government, employers and 
individual learners). For the purposes of this study, a more strict interpretation is taken to 
consider only the direct costs of training, represented by physical flows of cash or cash 
equivalents such as vouchers or training bonds.  
Direct employer co-investment in training in this study is therefore defined as actual 
expenditure by employers to finance training supported in part by public funds. This 
includes all direct costs incurred by the employer in training new and existing staff, 
including the fees and payments to external providers and those associated with internal 
training provision.  
Other direct costs, which are typically associated with training relate to the individual 
learner, include the cost of personnel absence during periods of external training and the 
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costs of supervision while undertaking on-the-job training. Here, policy responses and 
support mechanisms may also be targeted at the individual, but these are beyond the 
scope of this study. Other costs associated with training typically borne by employers 
including administration, travel and subsistence are considered either implicit or indirect 
and therefore not included. 
1.2.3 Model of co-funding in England 
In England, currently the State funds workplace learning by meeting the costs of the 
provider in delivering the training to employees. Government funding channelled through 
the Skills Funding Agency follows the employer or learner to the public or private providers 
of their choice. In 2010, employers ‘chose’ private training companies more than twice as 
often as public training institutions such as FE colleges and universities (BIS, 2013, p. 18). 
Over the past ten years there has been an increasing obligation on all training providers to 
obtain a contribution from employers towards the cost of the training they provide. This 
‘cost recovery’ depends on the level of learning, and only applies to learners aged over 19. 
In such cases, the State funding meets only 50 per cent of the estimated direct cost of 
training for a given programme, with employers or learners expected to contribute the 
remaining 50 per cent. However, as identified in the independent review of FE fees, this 
co-funding is not routinely collected (Banks, 2010).  
The publicly funded skills system is essentially a voluntary system which has had limited 
impact on increasing employer co-investment in skills, particularly amongst employers who 
do not usually invest in training. It is argued that this lack of co-funding indicates a wider 
concern around the current system; as employers are not directly paying for training they 
are not perceived to be sufficiently critical customers. Employers in the UK frequently 
express dissatisfaction with training through publicly funded training programmes. 
However, where they do not pay for training, they are considered less likely to engage with 
providers or demand better provision (Banks, 2010). 
While reporting to be dissatisfied with the training offered, the latest CVTS data for the UK 
finds that failures in the supply of courses were considered a relatively minor factor in 
preventing higher employer investment in training. Instead, barriers to training are mainly 
concerned with demand factors, such as, employer’s lack of need for training or 
unwillingness to pay its direct or indirect costs (BIS, 2013, p.19-20).  
In recent years, there have been a raft of initiatives aimed at increasing levels of work 
based training in England – some based on developing a high quality and responsive 
infrastructure (e.g. Centres of Vocational Excellence, Sector Skills Councils), others based 
on co-financing (e.g. Employer Training Pilots, Train to Gain). None of which have had the 
desired results. An impact evaluation of the Employer Training Pilots, for example, found 
no significant impact on attainment, or on uptake among the low-qualified, a key target 
group (Abramovsky et al. 2011). 
Sectoral levy arrangements also currently exist in three UK industries: engineering, 
construction and the film industry (UKCES, 2012b). The long-standing levy arrangement in 
the Construction Industry, for example, is based on firm contributions to the industry 
training board, subject to continuing industry consent of more than 50 per cent of member 
companies. More generally, only 15 per cent of UK employers (in 2010) contributed to 
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collective funds for vocational training, with an average contribution of £10,100 (BIS, 2013, 
p. 64).  
Employers in England can also claim corporation tax relief on employee development 
which covers both the costs of provision and opportunity (wage) costs. Similarly, self-
employed workers can claim income tax relief for investments on their own training – albeit 
only against the costs of provision and not loss of earnings. While the deduction of 
business expenses is the norm when computing the corporate income tax base (on net 
profits), the additional exemption of wage costs confers an incentive to train for employers 
in the UK but the effect of these incentives has not been evaluated. 
Figure 2: Current model of co-funding in England 
 
Source: developed by ICF GHK 
In a 2010 independent review of ‘Fees and Co-funding in Further Education in England’, 
Banks proposed the replacement of the existing funding system with one founded on the 
principles of: choice, responsiveness, transparency, flexibility, fairness and Government 
support to stimulate private investment. This review was followed in 2011 by a vision for 
employer ownership of skills set out by the UK Commission for Employment and Skill 
(UKCES). Under this proposal for a reformed co-funding model, employer engagement in 
the skills system would be greater, both in the design of provision and funding (UKCES, 
2011). 
The Skills Investment Statement (BIS, 2011a) identified a range of innovative approaches 
to be trialled, including the piloting of outcome based payments and skills funding routed 
via the employer. These are in addition to the incentive schemes directed at individuals, 
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beyond the scope of this study, such as the introduction of Advanced Learning Loans for 
individuals aged 24 or over.  
In 2012, BIS and the UKCES launched the Employer Ownership Pilot (EOP) to test the 
principle of employer-routed public funding backed by private co-investment. The EOP 
establishes a contestable fund of £340 million available over 4 years, which in the second 
round of funding (2013-14) represents less than 2 per cent of the total adult skills budget.4 
While the EOP has encouraged employers to propose innovative solutions and co-fund 
provision, the delivery model may not be scalable particularly for IVT such as 
apprenticeships (UKCES, 2013). 
The 2012 Richard Review and the follow up Government response sets out a strategy for 
the renewed model of apprenticeship funding, and provides further insight into the evolving 
English policy context. This is set out in box 1 below. 
                                            
4 The Employer Ownership budget in 2013-14 is £46 million compared to a total Adult Skills Budget of 
around £2.5 billion over the same period. Figures are based on BIS and DfE (2013b, p. 42). 
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Box 1: The Richard Review of Apprenticeships 
In his independent report published on 27 November 2012, Doug Richard called on 
the UK government to redefine the shape of the apprenticeship system, by 
encouraging the expansion of apprenticeships, improve their quality and make them 
more focused on the needs of employers (Richard, 2012). 
The main Richard recommendations include: 
 Target apprenticeships only at those who are new to a job or role that requires 
sustained and substantial training.  
 Focus on the outcome of an apprenticeship, rather than the process.  
 Recognised industry standards should form the basis of every apprenticeship.  
 The purchasing power for investing in apprenticeship training should lie with the 
employer.  
 The price for apprenticeship training should be free to respond to market value.  
To these ends, it is felt necessary for Government funding to create the right 
incentives for apprenticeship training. While Government should contribute to the 
cost, it is recommended that this is routed via the employer, in order to ensure 
relevance and drive up quality.  
While emphasising the need to link government payment to transferable training and 
successful completion of the course, options for a future funding model are however 
left open. These include: 
 Tax credit, whereby employers record how much is spent on eligible training and 
claim the expenses through their tax return and deducted from pre-tax profits or 
payroll taxes. 
 Direct subsidy by Government, to reimburse a proportion of expenditure towards 
training on completion of the apprenticeship.  
 A contestable fund, whereby groups of employers put forward proposals for 
Government co-investment to be selected on the basis of best value. 
On 14 March 2013, the Government issued its response to the Richard review (BIS 
and DfE, 2013a), endorsing the recommendations for reform and in particular to: 
 Place control of apprenticeships more firmly in the hands of employers. 
 Ensure that all apprenticeships are rigorous and responsive to employers’ needs.
The principle of co-investment is explicitly accepted in the latest update to the 
Government’s Skills Strategy (BIS and DfE, 2013b, p.36). 
Sources: Richard, D. (2012), BIS and DfE (2013a & 2013b) 
 
Taken together, the UKCES vision of employer ownership (UKCES, 2011), the Skills 
Investment Statement (BIS, 2011a), the Banks Review of FE (Banks, 2010) and the 
Richard Review of Apprenticeships (Richard, 2012), provide a clear steering on the 
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direction of the underlying principles which will need to be considered in implementing 
reforms to the English model of co-funding of FE and training. These are: 
 Employer purchasing power: Government funding routed via the employer to place 
purchasing power in their hands. 
 Market value pricing: Pricing of training fees which reflects their market value and is 
determined by negotiations between employers and training providers. 
 Employer choice: Flexibility on the delivery of training in terms of timing and content, 
which is guided by employer choice. 
 Output or outcome oriented support: Government support which is partly linked to 
achievement by conditioning payment on the completion of training or a particular level 
of attainment. 
 Accredited programmes: Emphasis on training with links to industry-accredited 
programmes and national qualifications frameworks. 
 Affordability and fiscal control: Managed and monitored expenditures to maintain 
control over the total fiscal liability of government co-funding.5 
1.3 Report structure 
The rest of this report is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 2 provides an overview of different co-funding models and reviews the 
international evidence of their efficiency and effectiveness. This review considers: 
employer awareness and uptake of incentives; the efficiency of allocation; the marginal 
effects on the quantity and quality of training stimulated; the impacts on employer and 
learner outcomes; and the wider impacts on the economy, FE and training system. 
 Chapter 3 explores three models of co-funding in Australia, Ireland and the Netherlands 
in order to establish the efficiency and effectiveness (or otherwise) of different 
approaches to co-funding. The case studies analyse what works and in what context, 
how it works and ascertains how reliable this evidence is in order to draw lessons for 
the English model of co-funding of training. 
 Chapter 4summarises the evidence from the literature review and case studies relevant 
to the research questions, and considers the role for government in shaping and 
influencing employer investment in skills and training.  
                                            
5 The guiding principles have been adapted by ICF GHK based on the recommendations expounded in 
Banks (2010), BIS, (2011a), Richard (2012) and UKCES (2011).  
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 Appendix 1 describes the methodology outlining how the evidence review was 
conducted and potential methodological biases, a summary of the key pieces of 
literature reviewed, an overview of research issues arising from the literature and details 
of the consultations conducted. 
 Appendix 2 describes the methodology and rationale for case study selection, and 
provides details of the interviews conducted.  
 Appendix 3 provides an indicative mapping of the English education system against the 
2011 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). 
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2 Literature review 
This section provides an overview of different co-funding models and 
reviews the international evidence of their effectiveness - drawing on 
evidence from a literature review and expert consultations. 
Box 2: Literature Review Summary 
Three overarching types of mechanism for delivering co-funding incentives to 
employers were identified by the literature review.  
Direct subsidy  
Governments in Australia, Denmark, Finland and Germany provide direct funding to 
employers’ in the form of grant payments or training vouchers. Such funding may also 
be channelled through training funds, such as the EOP in England. 
The key aspects associated with direct subsidy payments are: 
 Low levels of uptake. This may be attributed to a combination of a lack of 
awareness among employers of the availability of grant payments and the low 
levels of reward on offer relative to the costs of both accessing the funding and 
undertaking training activities. 
 The differential impacts of employer-routed incentives. The receipt by 
employers of larger amounts of subsidy is associated with increased levels of 
investment in formal training. The observed impacts tend however to be 
concentrated on only a small number of sectors. The evidence suggests that 
these differential impacts by sector are driven by a number of factors including 
industry attitudes towards training and the relative size of the subsidy in relation 
to the total costs of training. 
 The staging of the incentive offers. On the one hand, some degree of initial 
finance is required to assist firms facing cash flow problems. Equal levels of 
incentive attached to the completion or certification of training activities on the 
other hand may provide insufficient incentive as future rewards are uncertain. 
Tax expenditures 
Governments in Austria, Canada, France, Iowa (USA), Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, South Africa, and Spain provide indirect funding to employers’ in the 
form of tax allowances, credits, exemptions and reductions. Such relief may be 
channelled through the social security or corporate income tax systems.  
The key aspects associated with subsidies through the tax system are: 
 Ease of uptake. Take up of tax concessions by employers tend to be quite high. 
This is due to existing awareness and familiarity with the tax infrastructure. 
However, where conditions of claiming are applied this complicates the system, 
reduces uptake and leads to erroneous claims placing a greater burden on the 
Exchequer. 
 Problems of evaluation and monitoring. Researchers and policymakers have 
undertaken limited research into the influence of tax incentives for training, 
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Box 2: Literature Review Summary 
because they represent foregone revenues rather than the more visible costs 
associated with direct subsidies. It may also be that issues of confidentiality 
preclude public evaluation or external assessment. Furthermore, there are limits 
on how much tax administrations are able to audit tax subsidies and where 
monitoring processes have been put in place they are often costly, cumbersome 
or difficult to attach. There is therefore a lack of evidence on the impact of tax 
measures.  
 Concerns over quality. Tax offices can lack the expertise necessary to perform 
robust assessment of the eligibility of any claim. This places greater emphasis on 
the need to develop mechanisms for assuring quality and effectively signal these 
to employers and the Exchequer. Further, in cases where similar levels of 
incentive are provided for a variety of training activities, the tax expenditure may 
favour the pursuit of low intensity or short training programmes which attract the 
highest levels of funding.  
Levy system 
Employer contributions through levy systems are the most widespread mechanism 
used to induce employer co-investment in training. Levy systems have been adopted 
by Governments in Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Quebec (Canada), Singapore and Spain. 
Such levies may be based on compulsory or voluntary contributions, and may be 
applied universally or on a sector-by-sector or regional basis. In England, levy 
systems are in place in three sectors: construction, engineering and the film industry. 
The key aspects associated with levy systems are: 
 Resistance and superficial compliance. In the absence of an established 
consensus on the collective value of training, non-voluntary contributions to levy 
funds typically encounter resistance from employers.  
 Impacts on quality. Compulsory investment in training can make employers less 
vigilant over the quality of training. 
 Employer ‘buy-in’. Voluntary or opt-in levy arrangements can foster the 
development of consensus in the value and benefits of training. The flexibility and 
support for local or industry employer networks to develop organically can 
contribute to the development of collective interest among employers in providing 
accredited training for new entrants and existing employees. 
 The effects of framing. Sanctions or penalties as per ‘train or pay’ models serve 
to highlight the costs of training, rather than persuade employers that training is a 
worthwhile investment.  
Impacts and issues of implementation 
There is limited evidence of differentiated impacts on training outcomes on the basis 
of the type of model adopted. Instead, the extent to which their impacts differ is more 
often guided by the context in which they are delivered and the detail of specific 
conditions attached.  
The variety of tax expenditures, subsidies and levy-grant mechanisms adopted are 
fundamentally similar, insofar as they route government funding through employers. 
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Box 2: Literature Review Summary 
Key issues for implementation recurring across the different types of co-funding 
mechanism are: 
 The difficulty of targeting incentives. Little or no impact of incentives for 
employer co-investment on the low qualified is observed, even where these are 
the explicit targets of direct funding. Instead, co-funding incentives tend to support 
the training of workers and new entrants bearing qualifications. Financial 
incentives also tend to have a greater impact on those employers already 
investing in training. 
 The costs of administration borne by employers. Administrative procedures 
for accessing funding may serve to discourage small firms. In particular, 
instances of discretionary case-by-case assessment of funding applications or 
requirements to submit formal training plans tend to favour larger firms. The 
engagement of employer networks or group training organisations to act as 
intermediaries can mitigate this effect and help to support SMEs. 
 The behavioural context. The economic cycle, institutional and personal factors 
have a stronger influence than financial incentives on the take-up and completion 
of training. The uptake of co-funding instruments and employer co-investment in 
training are particularly influenced by perceptions of the benefits and 
effectiveness of training. These are shaped by individual attitudes, as well as 
cultural and social norms.  
In-depth case study analysis of tax, levy and subsidy-based schemes is undertaken 
in chapter 3 in order to draw out further lessons for implementation in an English 
context. 
2.1 Methodology  
The literature review has comprised three components: 
 An initial scan of international sources to identify co-funding delivery models used; 
 A literature review of the impact of co-funding instruments; and 
 Consultation with known academic and policy experts in the research field to identify 
emergent research material and establish their viewpoints on key issues. 
The review draws on peer-reviewed journal articles, non-peer reviewed academic 
research, government commissioned research, evaluations and ‘grey’ literature. 
Parameters for inclusion (and exclusion) were established to direct the study towards 
publications of explicit relevance to international models of delivering employer-routed co-
funding. Further emphasis was placed on identifying recent literature (post-2001) in order 
to identify existing delivery models.6 
                                            
6 Seminal papers providing empirical evidence are also considered for inclusion since their findings should 
still be robust. 
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A quality and relevance assessment of a preliminary list of identified sources was carried 
out via an initial scan of the literature and compilation of a ‘data extraction’ form. From an 
initial total of 89 identified studies, 63 were then assessed in detail for the purposes of 
synthesis.  
The literature review identified 40 different co-funding incentive schemes in 24 countries. 
In terms of geographic coverage, evaluative assessments and evidence on 18 of these co-
funding instruments and policies was available across 12 countries.7 A number of 
qualitative studies also provide comparative assessments of the approach to VET finance 
in two countries such as France and the UK, or Germany and Switzerland. Further 
comparative assessments of international experiences, extended the review’s coverage to 
other developed countries in Europe and the OECD.8  
2.2 Design and delivery of international models of co-funding  
Given the benefits of training, there is widespread ambition among policymakers of the 
need to encourage businesses to share the costs of training (see for example BIS, 2012b 
or BIBB, 2009). One way of achieving this is through delivery models and incentives that 
promote employer co-investment in training. There is widespread acknowledgment among 
the literature and consulted experts that the private sector is a critical partner for 
increasing cost efficiency, quality, and relevance in skills training. 
This review covers all instruments that seek to incentivise employer co-investment in 
training through voluntary or compulsory measures. This includes but not exclusively those 
which use the tax system for delivery.9 There are three main mechanisms in our typology 
of delivering such financial incentives to employers: direct subsidies, tax expenditures, and 
levy systems. Government incentives and financial support aimed at individual learners or 
which fund provision directly are beyond the scope of this study. Non-financial incentives 
are also beyond the direct scope of the study.10  
The provision of subsidies to employers, delivered directly via grant payments or indirectly 
through tax expenditures, can provide financial inducements for employers to make 
investments in training. In theory the lower cost of training is liable to alter the cost-benefit 
business decision to invest in training at the margin (by positively impacting on the 
perceived cost effectiveness of training). In turn, this will have a determining effect on the 
incidence and amount of training undertaken.  
                                            
7 Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Korea, the Netherlands 
and the US. 
8 Full details on the methodological approach to the literature review and details of the experts consulted are 
provided in Appendix 2. 
9 Typically no VAT or sales tax is applied to training fees, and training expenses can be fully deducted from 
corporate profits, as is the case with other types of company expenses. In line with Torres (2012), only 
stipulations going beyond this benchmark practice are considered incentives. 
10 This excludes regulatory approaches to improve the training offer through the accreditation of providers 
and certification of participants; guarantee individual rights to training; or extend the employer-employee 
relationship through payback clauses or training contracts. 
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Consultation with experts suggests that a crucial caveat to this hypothesis is the need for 
employers to believe that there is at least some value of training and that employers 
possess sufficient motivation to train. Lack of awareness or a prevailing scepticism 
regarding the benefits of training may hold back co-investment, particularly among smaller 
firms. This view is corroborated by a recent BIS review of employer motivations for training 
(BIS, 2012a).11 
An alternative way of overcoming a lack of employer investment in training is through a 
levy system. Rather than seeking to induce voluntary investments, levies instead make 
employer contribution to the costs of training compulsory (at least among a particular 
group of participating members). These costs are not necessarily a decision of the firm but 
instead represent a mandated fixed cost, much like a tax.  
Levies constitute a real but indirect expenditure for the employer. The key difference to an 
employer subsidy is that they involve both employers which participate in training and 
those which do not.  
Another variant is that some levy and grant-based instruments are delivered through 
contestable funds. There may also be uncertainty as to whether the investment is 
exclusively used to finance training activities. The funds may also be explicitly aimed at 
purposes unrelated to training to provide broader business support. 
Table 2 below provides an overview of the types of instrument directed at employers, and 
maps the 40 identified international examples onto this typology.12  
In practice, co-funding models may draw on multiple mechanisms and may not fit neatly 
under a single heading. For example, levy-grant systems based on a universal levy are 
ultimately a form of direct subsidy, albeit that the funding for the grants are drawn from 
what is essentially a form of hypothecated tax or a ring fenced revenue raising scheme. 
Tax incentives can be seen as a form of indirect subsidy, while refundable (or non-
wastable) tax credits are in essence grants delivered through the tax system.  
                                            
11 It follows that for employers, demonstrating the competitive advantage of training may be an effective 
alternative approach to the co-funding mechanisms explored in this study. In Switzerland, often considered 
among the forerunners in terms of high quality vocational training, a strong view is taken that tax incentives 
and subsidies are largely irrelevant and inefficient. Instead it is considered necessary to do more to ‘sell’ the 
benefits of training (Wolter, 2007).  
12 Funding schemes directed at individuals and providers are beyond the scope of this review. 
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Table 2: Typology of co-funding instruments and delivery mechanisms, and their international use 
Type of 
instrument 
Delivery 
mechanism 
Working Definitions Count
* 
Country / State examples 
Grant payment Direct government funding to employers for the 
purpose of training. Such funding may also be 
channelled through training funds. 
5 Australia, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland 
Direct 
subsidy 
Training 
voucher  
Funding in the form of vouchers to be 
exchanged for a certain amount or a certain 
value of training. 
1 Germany (North-Rhine 
Westphalia) 
Tax allowance Deduction of a certain sum or fraction of the 
costs of training investment from taxable 
profits, over and above the standard 
deductibility of training costs. 
8 Austria, Belgium (Flanders), 
Italy, Korea, Malta, South 
Africa, US (Iowa) 
Tax credit Deduction of a certain sum or fraction of a 
training investment from the tax liability, which 
is wastable (unable to reduce the amount of 
tax owed to less than zero) or refundable 
(entitles the employer to a payment if the relief 
reduces the amount of tax owed to less than 
zero). 
8 Austria, Canada, Chile, France, 
Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Spain, US 
(Mississippi) 
Tax 
expenditures 
Tax exemption 
/ reduction 
Employer social security contributions on 
trainees/apprentices are exempted from the 
tax base, or taxed at a lower rate. 
4 Austria, Australia (State level), 
Italy, Spain 
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Type of 
instrument 
Delivery 
mechanism 
Working Definitions Count
* 
Country / State examples 
Levy-
exemption 
Sanction or tax on firms if they do not meet a 
pre-determined level of training provision. 
4 Australia, Belgium, Canada 
(Quebec), France 
Levy-grant Employers pay a non-voluntary contribution to 
a training fund which is then disbursed to 
training firms. 
9 Cyprus, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, 
Netherlands, Spain 
Levy-access Employers contributing to the levy scheme 
have access to training developed or procured 
by the managing body at discounted rates. 
5 Denmark, France, Ireland, 
Singapore, UK 
Levy system 
Levy-
reimbursement
Employers pay a non-voluntary contribution to 
a training fund which is then used to reimburse 
the costs of training. 
1 Malaysia 
Source: developed by ICF GHK; Notes: Italics indicate that the policy has expired or been abandoned. * For simplicity, 
multiple schemes of a similar nature existing at State or regional level within the same country are counted as 1. 
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Within each category of instrument, there is also much room for differentiation between 
models, as co-finance mechanisms may be universal, sector-based, or specifically 
targeted at particular groups of enterprises (e.g. SMEs) or individuals (e.g. under 25s, low 
qualified). They may also focus on new entrants to the labour force or existing staff, or only 
seek to promote specific types of training, such as apprenticeships.  
Co-finance schemes can also differ in terms of the types of costs that are subsidised or 
reimbursed and the timing or staging of employer and government contributions. Tax 
incentives for example, can be redeemed at the end of the year through deductions on 
taxable income at the time of filing a tax return. Alternatively, the tax relief may be provided 
on a monthly basis through deductions on regular tax remittances, such as employer 
social security contributions. Financial incentives can also be staged over the period of the 
training, for example, with an initial payment made when an employer takes on a trainee 
and a further payment upon completion. Depending on its timing, the government 
contribution may reduce the upfront costs to be paid to a training provider or provide a 
reimbursement over and above the value of such costs.  
Before exploring the impact that these instruments have on training outcomes (in section 
2.4), the qualitative evidence on barriers to efficient implementation and take up is 
considered. 
2.3 Administration and uptake of co-funding instruments 
The absence of monitoring and evaluation studies in many cases, means the review is 
unable to identify clear patterns associating a particular type of co-funding instrument with 
higher levels of uptake. The literature also pays little attention to the impact of awareness 
raising and information campaigns on rates of uptake or levels of training.  
There is however broad agreement - among the experts consulted and literature reviewed 
- that the more that specific groups are targeted and the more in which eligibility conditions 
are applied to ensure quality, the more administratively expensive the co-funding 
instrument will be (Stone and Braidford, 2008; Cedefop, 2008a).  
In order to be efficient and attractive to employers, the eligibility conditions and restrictions 
attached to co-funding incentives need to be carefully traded off against administrative 
costs. There is also a recognised need for administrative simplicity in order for target 
beneficiaries to understand the incentive and comply with any conditions. 
To date, there have also been no systematic attempts to quantify the costs of the 
administrative burden of the various instruments on employers and the Exchequer. 
Researchers have instead relied on qualitative information based on reported experiences 
or comparative analysis. The findings can be organised around those mechanisms which 
make use of the tax system and those which do not. 
2.3.1 Tax expenditures 
In a comparative analysis of tax incentive schemes in Austria, France and the 
Netherlands, Cedefop (2009) reports that take-up of tax concessions by enterprises are 
‘quite high’. In the Netherlands, for example, an evaluation in 2007 suggested that around 
80 per cent of eligible enterprises made use of the refundable lump-sum tax credit. The 
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remaining 20 per cent were unable to meet the necessary requirements. This suggests 
that the administrative burden rather than a lack of awareness was the main cause of the 
lack of take-up (Gelderblom et al. 2007).13 
The offsetting of training costs against profits in company tax returns are considered easy 
to apply and inexpensive to administer. It also enables employers to decide on who will be 
trained and how (Stone, 2010). Similarly, tax allowances, credits or levies routed through 
established payroll tax systems are also considered as being relatively light on 
administrative burden.  
In utilising the existing tax infrastructure, Torres (2012) found that the Austrian tax 
incentive scheme is associated with low administrative costs (both for government and 
employers). In Austria firms could deduct the costs of training plus an extra 20 per cent 
from their taxable profits or alternatively claim a 6 per cent refundable tax credit. The 
introduction of the option of taking up a 6% refundable tax credit meant that firms not 
making profits could be included. This is seen as particularly advantageous to start-ups 
and other non-profit making firms (Cedefop, 2009). 
Also in Austria, an incentive to support employers taking on apprentices created virtually 
universal uptake. Almost 100 per cent of eligible companies are thought to have claimed 
the tax incentives for taking on apprentices (Cedefop, 2009).14 However, this 
apprenticeship tax credit scheme was abolished in 2008 and replaced with a grant system. 
The reason for abolishing the tax-based support system is that it did not allow for 
differentiated and well-targeted support. It is argued that the tax-based support did not 
take into account the duration of apprenticeships or the total costs to the employer. The 
new grant-based system relates subsidies to quality criteria in training which would not 
have been possible under the tax-based system (Cedefop, 2009).  
From a government perspective, Torres (2012) also highlights that there are limits as to 
how much Exchequers are able to audit tax incentive systems. In addition, monitoring 
processes can often be costly, cumbersome and/or difficult. The tax office may also lack 
sufficient expertise of training or the accreditation system here to perform robust 
assessment of the eligibility of any claim (Torres, 2012). 
From the employers’ perspective, the tax system is understood relatively well, particularly 
by large employers. That notwithstanding, the tax experts consulted, as part of the study, 
suggest that where the complexity of claiming is high employers will not bother claiming or 
will make mistakes. This, in turn, places a greater administrative burden on the Exchequer. 
Taken together this raises the potential for problems of compliance among employers or 
leave room for fraudulent activity that may go undetected in the absence of costly 
processes to monitor and audit.  
                                            
13 The Dutch scheme of co-funding is examined in further detail in chapter 3. 
14 A refundable tax credit of €1,000 (£833) per year per apprentice plus an additional €400 (£333) a month 
during year one of the apprenticeships, €200 (£167) in year two and €100 (£83) in year three was available. 
A bonus of €3,000 (£2,500) per apprentice was granted where apprentices successfully took a quality test. 
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2.3.2 Direct subsidies and levy systems 
In Australia, direct grant payments are used to support employer investment in 
apprenticeships. In their analysis of this scheme, Karmel et al. (2010) found that actual 
expenditure on incentive payments in 2004-05 represented 83 per cent of the total amount 
employers were eligible to receive. The uptake of completion incentives is slightly higher 
with between 90 and 92 per cent of eligible employers claiming.15 
Relatively little is known about the rate of uptake regarding subsidy and levy systems. A 
problem common to each of these systems is that while the number of claiming firms or 
member companies may be monitored, the proportion of eligible firms out of the total 
number of employers is either unknown or unreported.  
In the case of levy-grant and direct subsidy arrangements, funding typically entails case-
by-case decisions and management to ensure specific quality objectives are met. This 
necessarily increases the cost of administration. 
Alternatively, the lack of sufficient guidance and monitoring processes can lead to greater 
abuse or non-compliance. In an assessment of the Australian training guarantee levy 
scheme (abandoned in 1996), a survey of over 6,000 employers found that a lack of clarity 
in the guidelines and reporting requirements undermined both the effectiveness and the 
reputation of the program (Fraser, 1996).16 Smith and Billet (2006) argue that levy-
exemption schemes, such as this, serve only to highlight the costs of training to firms, 
rather than persuade them that expenditure on training was itself a worthwhile investment. 
In a comparative analysis of international levies and subsidy instruments, universal 
schemes were often found to be inefficient in ensuring an equitable distribution of training 
opportunities. The unavoidable administrative procedures needed to claim 
reimbursements often discourage uptake, especially among smaller firms (OECD, 2009). 
A criticism of mandated approaches, such as levies, is that they tend to be resisted or 
complied with only superficially (Smith and Billet 2006). For example, under the levy 
system in France, firms were reportedly reluctant to spend beyond the minimum required 
by the levy (Giraud, 2002).  
Training funds based on sector-specific or local levies are seen as relatively more effective 
since they are typically negotiated as part of collective agreements and give employers 
control over the fund (OECD, 2009). Smith and Billet (2006) also note that the French 
experience suggests firms are more accepting of sectoral or regional levies, particularly 
where firms have representation on the bodies that disperse the training funds. The 
importance of social institutions and norms in influencing employer ‘buy-in’ to engage and 
invest in training are widely recognised. 
                                            
15 The Australian scheme of co-funding is examined in further detail in chapter 3. 
16 Large enterprises were required under the scheme to spend at least 1.5 per cent of their payroll costs on 
eligible training or pay the shortfall to the Australian Taxation Office. 
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Intermediary agencies and networks may also provide a means of managing the 
administrative burden and ensuring efficiency for employers. At Government level, 
specialist intermediary State agencies responsible for managing, monitoring and auditing 
financial support are often established and may relieve some of the burden of assessment 
and ensuring compliance on employers. Similarly from an employers’ perspective, 
employer associations, social partners or other networks may also be established to ease 
the administrative burden and support employer claims. In England there already exist 
statutory bodies that could undertake this role. The Skills Funding Agency for example 
makes funding and support available in order to help businesses and individuals access 
the training they require. 
Key findings: A trade-off exists between the targeting of additional training outcomes and 
the conditioning of finance on certain outputs with the costs and administrative burden that 
this places on employers and government. The evidence on the rates of uptake and 
employer awareness of a particular incentive and government support is mixed and 
relatively under-explored. The positive effects of achieving employer ‘buy-in’ through direct 
employer involvement in administering the scheme is widely recognised. The detailed case 
study analysis in chapter 3 seeks to fill these gaps and investigates the issue in more 
detail. 
2.4 Evidence of impacts 
Overall, robust, quantitative evidence on the impacts of co-funding instruments is sparse. 
There is, however, mostly qualitative evidence available across the full range of delivery 
models. Relatively speaking, research and evaluations on the effectiveness of particular 
co-financing models or policy instruments cover levy and subsidy schemes more 
extensively – and also more intensively – than tax incentives. 
On the one hand, the lack of research on the influence of tax incentives may be indicative 
of the challenges researchers and policymakers face in monitoring and evaluating the 
impact of such measures. From another perspective, the lack of research and evaluations 
of tax expenditures may reflect the lack of public scrutiny of foregone revenues. Here, 
issues of confidentiality may also preclude public evaluation or external assessment of the 
effects of tax incentives on education and training. In addition, any assessment of tax 
incentives may be subject to delays due to the time lag from obtaining data on tax returns.  
This lack of evidence notwithstanding, it is possible to draw lessons for the delivery of 
taxes from research into other schemes, which in many cases route funding through tax 
instruments. For example, tax incentives also operate as a form of indirect subsidy.  
The international evidence base covers schemes which are aimed at all firms, though 
SMEs are often particularly targeted. The low skilled and those with no or low 
qualifications are also often the focus of additional support. The co-funding arrangements 
and incentives cover all types of training, ranging from apprenticeships and traineeships, 
continuing work-based learning and on-the-job training. 
Across the many and varied types of co-funding model identified, there is a relatively 
limited amount of high quality evidence available. Few studies include a control group or 
investigate the counterfactual (what would have happened otherwise). The majority of the 
studies rely instead on descriptors of what the incentive is, and what the outcomes are 
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before and after the instrument is introduced without controlling for other possible 
explanatory factors.  
Most of the identified impacts rely on self-reported information or are based on secondary 
evidence and subsequent inference of causal relationships. A select few studies, base 
their assessments of impact on analysis of administrative data, robust survey evidence or 
by establishing a control group or series of controls, to assess the impact of policy 
variables.  
The following section explores the impacts of co-funding instruments drawing from on high 
quality evaluative studies available.  
Overall these studies have more to say about impacts on the quantity and quality of 
training and the differential impacts across different target groups. There is less focus on 
the impacts on the wider provider and delivery infrastructure and the responsiveness to 
employer needs, and where they are there is a reliance on qualitative information. 
2.4.1 Effects on the incidence and intensity of training 
Across the literature, evidence suggests that while training subsidies and incentives tend 
to be associated with increased employer investment in training, their impact on employers 
and individuals who would not have otherwise engaged in training is mixed. 
Participation in training activities 
How the quantity of investment in training is measured (in number of workers trained, time 
spent on training, the frequency of training, training expenses, or the number of training 
firms etc.) has little influence on the overall estimated effects of subsidies on the amount of 
training. In fact, given the imperfect measures of training available to researchers, it is 
often not possible to provide a precise interpretation of whether the findings relate to an 
increase in the intensity of training, the incidence of training, or indeed both. 
In a comparative assessment of the impact of training grants in Ireland, Goerg and Strobl 
(2006), find evidence that grant funding contributed to significantly greater overall 
expenditure on training in both domestic and foreign-owned firms. But whether this is due 
to increases in the quality or quantity of training is unknown. This positive relationship 
holds even after having controlled for other possible determining factors and in comparing 
outcomes with those of an established control group.17  
The levels of training among firms in receipt of training subsidies through the Job Skill 
Development Program in Korea, is significantly higher than those in equivalent 
‘unsubsidised’ firms (Lee, 2004). Furthermore, when the levy rate was reduced, the share 
of companies providing training programmes fell significantly. This demonstrates that few 
companies had introduced training programmes on their own initiative.  
                                            
17 A valid counterfactual is established by comparing a sample of assisted firms to those a sample of firms 
that did not receive assistance but otherwise share similar characteristics (i.e. via a matching estimator and 
difference-in-difference techniques). 
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Exploiting the regional differences to evaluate the impact of training subsidies in Italy, 
Brunello et al (2012) report a statistically significant, yet moderate increase in the number 
of distinct episodes of formal vocational training. In an analysis of the impact of the now 
defunct apprenticeship subsidies in Denmark, additional demand for apprentices is 
estimated to have been 7 per cent larger than without the subsidy (Westergard-Nielsen 
and Rasmussen, 1997). 
Such a positive relationship between direct subsidies and increased quantity of employer 
investment in training has also been found when training vouchers rather than cash 
incentives are used. In the case of the regional initiative of North Rhine Westphalia in 
Germany, Goerlitz (2010) estimate an additional 5 per cent increase in the proportion of 
establishments investing in training as a result of the subsidy. This finding can be 
interpreted as meaning that either training investments occur more frequently or that the 
fraction of firms willing to invest in training increases, or both. The evidence on the 
intensity of training is however inconclusive (Goerlitz, 2010). 
Not all co-funding instruments have been successful in inducing greater training efforts 
however. In particular, there is limited evidence that levy-exemption instruments - in which 
companies that are unable to demonstrate sufficient investment in training must pay a 
penalty - are successful in inducing greater training efforts (Fraser, 1996 and Goux and 
Marin, 2000).  
Due to a lack of monitoring and comprehensive evaluation, there is also limited robust 
evidence on the effectiveness of tax expenditures in stimulating increased employer 
training efforts (Muller and Behringer, 2011). An illustrative example of the difficulty in 
establishing a causal relationship between co-funding instruments and training outcomes 
is provided in Box 3 below. 
Box 3: Difficulties of controlling for impact: the case of sector training funds 
In the case of sector training funds in the Netherlands, Kamphuis et al. (2010) find no 
significant difference in the levels of regular and apprenticeship training in Dutch 
firms in sectors where a fund is present than in those without a fund. However while 
no difference in training outcomes is observable it remains possible that the sector 
training funds are effective.  
On the one hand, the lack of any observed impacts could be due to the financial 
incentives being insufficient to trigger an investment in training; or to a lack of 
awareness or bureaucracy that may impede their effective use.  
On the other hand, the lack of any observed outcome may be due to incentives being 
used to stimulate training particular sectors which have low levels of training. Levels 
of training may have been even lower without the funds.  
This lack of ability to construct an appropriate counterfactual is an inherent difficulty 
in assessing the effectiveness of levy-based arrangements, since they tend to be 
universally applied (either across sectors or across employers within a particular 
sector) thereby making it difficult to identify a suitable control group against which 
comparisons can be drawn. 
Source: developed by ICF GHK based on Kamphuis et al. (2010) 
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While it is accepted that greater financial inducements tend to be associated with 
increases in employer participation and investment in training, no study has sought to 
analyse the price sensitivity of training and rates of training uptake (Wolter, 2008). 
Furthermore, when subjected to more intensive scrutiny, there is often also accompanying 
evidence of substantial displacement or deadweight effects attached to a particular 
initiative.18 
In Austria, for example, Wacker (2007) finds that 70 per cent of companies benefitting from 
the apprenticeship tax credits did not create additional apprentices. In England, 
Abramovsky et al. (2011) find no statistically significant impact of the Employer Training 
Pilots programme on the proportion of employer provision of qualification-based training or 
on the fraction of eligible employees undertaking qualification-based training. Instead the 
pilot attracted ‘a considerable number of employers who would also have provided this 
type of training’ in its absence (Abramovsky et al. 2011, p.157). 
Any financial mechanism targeted towards employers to support the demand for training 
will necessarily engender at least some deadweight. Comparative analyses carried out by 
Muller and Behringer (2011) and Cedefop (2009) suggest that the magnitude of 
deadweight may vary among financial mechanisms. Tax incentives and levy-exemption 
schemes in particular are often associated with higher levels of deadweight loss.  
The different ways in which public investment or support of training may represent 
deadweight or added value are explored in Box 4 below.  
                                            
18 Deadweight is defined as the extent to which government-funded training generates outcomes that are not 
additional to what would have occurred in the absence of such provision. Displacement relates to instances 
where the positive outcomes promoted by government policy are offset by negative outcomes of the same 
policy elsewhere. Issues of deadweight and displacement are considered in more detail in box 4.  
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Box 4: Considerations of additionality and deadweight 
In the context of co-funding instruments used in relation to FE and training, 
‘deadweight’ is the term applied to the extent to which the identified outcomes (e.g. 
employer investment in training) would have occurred anyway in the absence of the 
government intervention. The inverse of deadweight is ‘additionality’ i.e. the 
outcomes which can be attributed to the government support. 
Additionality may take several forms depending on the intended objective of the 
policy intervention. Broadly speaking, additional training outcomes may relate to: 
 Industry level: industries who would not have otherwise invested in comparable 
training activities (or not to the same degree); 
 Firm-level: enterprises or establishments who would not have otherwise invested 
in comparable training activities (or not to the same degree);  
 Individual level: individuals who would not have otherwise participated in 
comparable training activities (or not to the same degree).  
At each of these levels of analysis, deadweight may occur when the industries, firms 
or individuals that would have engaged in some comparable form of training receive 
public funding for the training instead. Public funding in this sense simply replaces or 
‘crowds out’ private investment in other forms of training. 
Rather than displacing private funding, public interventions may instead lead to 
substitution, in which there is a change in the profile of the industries or employers 
that engage in training activities or in the profile of employees that receive it. Positive 
outcomes promoted by government policy may also be displaced or offset by 
negative outcomes of the same policy elsewhere. 
Additionality may also be qualitative in nature and relate to increases in particular 
types of training activity or to higher quality training activities in which industries or 
firms would otherwise have under-invested (relative to the benefits to the industry or 
firm that would be accrued, or to socially optimal levels).  
Source: developed by ICF GHK based on BIS (2012c) 
 
Industry-level effects 
Evidence from the literature demonstrates that universal levy, subsidy and tax incentives 
have differential impacts on sectors. Uptake of incentives can also differ markedly across 
industrial sectors (Jin and Lipsman, 2011 and Gelderblom et al. 2007) but there is however 
little consistent evidence of heterogeneous effects (Abramovsky et al. 2011).  
In their analysis of the influence of Danish employer subsidies for apprenticeships on a 
random sample of 1,000 workplaces, Westergard-Nielsen and Rasmussen (1997) find that 
the positive impacts of the Danish apprenticeship subsidy are limited to Offices, 
Manufacturing and Trade industries. Construction and Restaurant industries instead 
employ a number of apprentices irrespective of the subsidy. Further, they find that the 
observed positive impacts are largely driven by sector performance, indicating that 
economic activity drives demand for apprentices more than the level of subsidies. During 
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times of economic prosperity, more employees are taken on by employers to meet the 
increased demand. Firms are also less likely to be hampered by cash-flow problems 
during a boom, and thereby more able to invest in training new and existing staff alike 
(Westergard-Nielsen and Rasmussen, 1997). 
In any given context, there are different drivers - structural weaknesses, exposure to 
competition - which will affect sectors differently and it may not be possible to accurately 
predict a priori which sectors are most likely to benefit from the introduction of any new or 
revised co-funding instrument. 
Cully (2008) suggests that the effects on industry will be influenced by the value of the 
incentive as a share of the total costs of training in the sector. The implicit value of the 
Australian Apprenticeship subsidies on this basis was noted to be greatest (representing 
up to 20 per cent of the total costs) in retail trade, accommodation and restaurants – areas 
in which youth unemployment rates are high.  
Employer-level effects 
In view of the particular challenges for SMEs to engage and invest in training for their 
employees, many of the identified instruments of co-funding include specific objectives to 
increase the uptake of training among this group of employers. However, even in such 
cases where small firms are explicitly targeted through subsidies, little or no impact on 
small firms is observed. Instead much greater impacts on large and mid-sized companies 
are found (Goerlitz, 2010, Brunello et al. 2012). Tax incentives trialled in Korea in the 
1990s, despite their relatively generous levels, were also found to have little impact on 
smaller firms (Stone, 2010). 
In particular it is noted that grant-based systems and subsidies channelled through 
contestable funds tend to favour larger firms who can more readily manage the 
administrative burden (Brunello et al. 2012) or are more aware of the available incentives 
(Goerlitz, 2010). In France the requirement for a company to have a formal training plan in 
order to access the levied training funds means that SMEs de facto subsidise the training 
of larger firms (Cour des comptes, 2007).  
The way in which tax credits and allowances are delivered may also impact on different 
groups of employers. Wastable tax credits that deduct a certain sum or fraction of a 
training investment from the corporate tax liability without being able reduce the amount of 
tax owed to less than zero, or tax allowances which deduct the costs of training investment 
from taxable profits, necessarily favour corporations making large profits. Non-wastable or 
refundable incentives on the other hand mean that firms can still claim money even if no 
profits are made - in effect acting as grants. This can be particularly advantageous to start-
ups and social enterprises (Cedefop, 2009).  
The Skillnets Training Network Programme in Ireland, whereby co-funding instruments 
support the development of networks of firms by sector or region, and may go some way 
to help smaller firms access training through a group training approach. Here, 94 per cent 
of the member companies are small firms (Circa Group, 2012).19  
                                            
19 The Irish scheme of co-funding is examined in further detail in chapter 3. 
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Individual-level effects 
There is often a virtuous circle of training whereby the more highly paid or qualified receive 
the most training. Temporary and low-qualified employees receive the least as the returns 
on investment are seen to be lower. Evidence of this ‘Matthew Effect’20 is seen to be 
particularly pronounced in cases where the decision not to invest in training is met with a 
penalty (Fraser, 1996 and Goux and Marin, 2000).  
Goerlitz (2010) and IGF (2011) found that subsidies led to increased training for 
employees already holding a vocational or other degree and not for those with low or no 
qualifications. The evidence from the ETPs in England also indicates a limited impact on 
take-up among hard-to-reach target groups, such as the low skilled (Abramovksy et al. 
2011). Giraud (2002) also finds that the French levy has not been able to influence how 
training funds are spent within enterprises noting that the distribution of training between 
better and less-educated workers is unaffected. 
A possible exception to this finding is based on qualitative analysis of the Skills 
Development Fund in Singapore. Here, the expenditures from the training fund (raised 
from a 0.25 per cent levy on the gross monthly remuneration of all employees) apply only 
to programmes that seek to raise the education levels of low-skilled workers. As a result, 
Low (1998) finds that national investment in training among employees in this group 
increased to 4 per cent of payroll. It is not clear if such an increase would have happened 
in the absence of the levy fund. The Singaporean success in raising employer investment 
in the low skilled may however have been a one-off, and a special result of its small size 
and strong collective identity (Low, 1998). Smith and Billet (2006) report that the Singapore 
model has been unsuccessfully translated to Malaysia where employer ‘buy-in’ proved 
more difficult to achieve (Smith and Billet, 2006).  
While not being particularly successful at reaching the low skilled, co-funding instruments 
may have a wide range of objectives. In a comprehensive empirical assessment of the 
impact of the tax deduction on training for the over 40s, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) 
found that the proportion of employees in this target group receiving training increased 
significantly. However this increase was more than offset by a decline in training for 
employees who were slightly below the 40 year old threshold. The tax deduction for firms 
appears to have led to postponement of training activities for those just below the age 
threshold and a negative net effect overall.  
Key findings: The available evidence suggests that financial instruments haven’t been 
particularly successful in increasing engagement among groups under-represented in 
training activities and that incentive mechanisms may often lead to unintended 
consequences – even when these are explicitly targeted at specified equity goals. Once 
again, employer ‘buy-in’ appears to have a positive effect on the impact of different 
schemes. Before looking at the evidence on the effects of the quality of training, it is 
therefore worthwhile considering the evidence on the efficiency of allocation with respect 
to the different mechanisms of delivery. 
 
                                            
20 “For whosoever has, to him shall be given, and he shall have more in abundance” (Matthew 13:12). 
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2.4.2 Effects on training quality 
A funding scheme that supports employer investment and participation in training only 
makes sense if the training is of sufficient quality. A key consideration in this respect is the 
degree to which the training undertaken is quality assured and recognised by industry or 
approved national qualification frameworks.  
Accreditation and certification 
By comparing the training outcomes in Germany and the Netherlands, Allaart et al. (2009) 
find evidence that greater prevalence of formal training courses leading to accredited 
qualifications in the Netherlands: ‘might be a result of the specific institutional framework 
conditions’ since only the expenditures for formal further training qualify for tax deduction 
(Allaart et al. 2009). There is however no evidence of a significant impact on educational 
attainment as measured by qualifications in the case of the Employer Training Pilots in the 
UK (Abramovsky et al. 2011). 
However, as Brunello et al. (2012) highlight, it remains possible that the higher incidence 
of formal accreditation of training does not produce any additional training, but instead 
reflects a substitution between non-formal and formal training. However, a lack of available 
data on non-formal training makes it difficult for international research to empirically 
establish the extent to which such substitution occurs. In any case, whether additional or 
not, the induced shift to accredited forms of training is often in line with government 
objectives to provide the workforce with portable skills and results in more employers 
being engaged with the national qualification frameworks, as end users. 
Based on anecdotal evidence, some researchers have gone further in suggesting that as a 
result of specific conditions on co-funding, less relevant training may be pursued that 
maximises incentives rather than productive returns to training. Based on evaluations of 
the Australian Apprenticeship Initiatives Programme (AAIP) and the Netherlands tax 
credits for training scheme (in which similar levels of subsidy are available for a variety of 
training types and levels) firms are seen to have pursued the low intensity / shorter training 
programmes. This enables them to maximise the amount of incentives they can receive at 
the lowest cost (Deloitte, 2012; Berkhout et al. 2012). 
In the case of the levy-exemption penalty system, an empirical assessment of the impacts 
of the train-or-pay instrument in Quebec (based on a sample of 5,500 enterprises) 
concluded that facing the choice between using their revenue for training or simply losing 
it, employers are less concerned with the quality of training. A possible effect of the 
Quebec training levy has therefore been to reduce the average quality of training (Smith 
and Gagnon 2005). 
It follows that any co-funding instrument and delivery mechanism should pay careful 
consideration to the possible substitution or displacement effects and perverse incentives 
towards the quality of training. Ultimately however, financial instruments have a rather 
limited determining impact on quality. Instead, this tends to be determined by quality 
assurance processes, the value attached to training, and the quality of the trainers. A 
further consideration is that training quality is not the same across sectors – as industry 
norms and standards, the ability to attract and retain quality teaching staff differs, while the 
underlying perceptions and attitudes towards training in different sectors may often be 
embedded or entrenched within wider society. 
45 
Final Report: International Evidence Review on Co-funding for Training 
 
From an employers’ perspective, the most important attribute of quality with regard to 
training is arguably its relevance and responsiveness to the firm’s needs – an issue 
explored in Box 5 below.  
Box 5: Responsiveness to employer needs 
In moving to a more employer-focused model of investment in training in England, 
the only arbiter of quality of training that matters in such a model is arguably the 
employer. Employers are likely to be concerned with the relevance of the training to 
meeting their needs in terms of the skills and competences developed and the 
technologies and tools employed as well as more practical issues such as the 
timeliness, duration and location of the training offer (BIS, 2012a). 
There is, however, little concrete evidence of a direct impact of co-funding 
instruments on the responsiveness of provision to employer needs. Consultation with 
VET experts supported by available qualitative evidence suggests that this is instead 
determined by the context in which the co-funding model operates, and particularly 
whether employers are directly involved in the design and administration of co-
funding and have direct influence over the systems of accreditation and certification 
(Banks, 2010). 
Source: developed by ICF GHK based on expert consultations 
 
Key findings: Robust evidence on the role of co-funding instruments and delivery 
mechanisms in supporting quality training outcomes is relatively limited, with experts 
suggesting that the wider training infrastructure, investment and supporting regulatory 
approaches are more important. 
2.4.3 Economic impacts and the impacts on the wider skills system 
Productivity and wage returns 
In terms of the economic benefits that are derived from the additional training associated 
with the co-funding instruments, there is only limited evidence available of positive 
marginal impacts on wage or productivity effects of training (Jin and Lipsman, 2011 and 
Brunello et al. 2012). Here, measurement of the impacts of training is compromised by 
issues of endogeneity.21 
In one of the few assessments of the outcomes of co-funding instruments, a qualitative 
survey of responses from 704 member companies of the Skillnets training programme in 
Ireland found that most of the employers agreed that the training had contributed to 
improved productivity. Furthermore, many of the companies surveyed stated that the 
network training activities had made a significant or high impact on productivity. These 
outcomes are explored in more detail in a case study in chapter 3.  
                                            
21 An endogenous variable is one that is related to and determined by other variables also in the model. 
Training decisions can be endogenous for two reasons: on the one hand, there can be unobservable 
characteristics, such as managerial quality and attitudes that determine both training and socio-economic 
outcomes. On the other hand, training may be a choice variable, so that idiosyncratic shocks at firm or 
industry level affect both training decisions and outcomes such as productivity (Colombo and Stanca, 2008). 
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In the US State of Iowa, an econometric study found that the training tax credits for new 
recruits are estimated to have helped employers retain skilled employees and retain 
workers 6 months longer than non-participants. The marginal impact of the training 
program on the participating firm revenues was positive, but statistically insignificant. 
Generally speaking, there is a wealth of evidence emerging from the wider literature that 
has shown that the rewards to firm sponsored training are high, but that not all of the 
benefits are captured by the firm providing the training (Cedefop, 2011b). Instead these 
are shared between the individual, the firm and the wider economy. From an individual 
perspective, relatively more highly trained/skilled workers receive higher wages, and are 
less frequently unemployed (and for less time).  
In Switzerland, for example, in a cost-benefit analysis of apprenticeship training, Dionysius 
et al. (2009) demonstrate that the training is largely beneficial to the firms even during the 
training period itself as well as when the apprentice graduates to become a full employee.  
In a similar report on the benefits of apprenticeship training in England, BIS (2012b) finds 
that beyond identified productivity benefits, employers also report further positive impacts 
on training. Such benefits include the inflow of new skills, the ability of firms to meet 
current and future recruitment needs, the increased ability to recruit new and retain 
existing staff, to reward and motivate employees, and also to keep up with the competition. 
In addition, the support of training aimed at the unemployed, disadvantaged or young 
groups is also considered to enable firms to build brand awareness and loyalty, as well as 
fulfil corporate social responsibility goals (BIS, 2012b). 
Effects on the Exchequer 
It is notable from evaluations of fiscal impact that the productivity gains, higher wages and 
shorter periods of unemployment associated with training provides some return to public 
funding costs (Circa Group, 2012 and Jin and Lipsman, 2011). Limited evidence on the 
cost effectiveness of the various international instruments has however been established. 
In the context of growing fiscal pressures and public scrutiny of government budgets, the 
possibility to manage the total government liability and the potential impacts that this may 
have on the efficiency and effectiveness of the co-funding allocation mechanisms are 
considered in Box 6. 
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Box 6: Limiting the Exchequer’s fiscal liability: the role of funding caps 
There are limited examples of measures to cap the fiscal burden, where tax and 
subsidy co-funding mechanisms are used. On the available evidence, it appears that 
a fiscal cap is typically applied on the level of incentives for an individual learner, 
employer or employers’ network rather than across the whole scheme.  
Whilst no explicit fiscal caps at programme level have been identified a natural fiscal 
cap will be maintained, for example, where a limited number of apprenticeship places 
are available.  
Critiques of funding caps cite that in principle, incentives can at best influence 
behaviours at the margin so in capping any expenditure it effectively limits the 
support to training investments that would have occurred anyway. In relation to the 
ETP, the capped amount of funding available during the evaluation period is 
considered to have limited the scale of the program and its ability to lead to additional 
training outcomes (Abramovsky et al. 2011). 
For levy-grant and levy-access systems, the extent to which these are self-financing 
will act as a natural cap on expenditures. Here, it should be noted that levy 
arrangements funded on the basis of payroll or firm size will be pro-cyclical since the 
funds will grow as firms recruit more staff. In such cases it may be necessary to 
agree to an additional limit on maximum and minimum expenditure. This will ensure 
that funds are available to be drawn down in a recession and that expenditure 
remains prudent in an upturn.  
However the accumulation of reserves in times of economic prosperity can be seen 
as an indication of the limited efficiency of these funds (Kamphuis et al. 2010). 
Employers, in particular, may begin to question where the money has gone. Indeed, 
in the case of universal compulsory levies in Cyprus and Hungary the consulted 
experts highlighted the risk that employers perceive that their compulsory 
contribution gets ‘lost in the system’. In a recession, the opposite may hold, and 
support for collective investment in training may be limited when the individual firms 
themselves may struggle to meet the upfront costs of training finance.  
Source: developed by ICF GHK based on expert consultations 
 
Delivery and training infrastructure 
The evidence base on the wider impacts of co-funding instruments on the delivery and 
training infrastructure is largely anecdotal and qualitative in nature. Concretely, the 
redirection of training away from on-the-job to more formal and external provision relating 
to the need for documentation / costing, has contributed to the development of the skills 
system in France (Smith and Billet, 2006) and the Netherlands (Berkhout et al. 2012). 
In a comparative analysis of nine models of levy finance, Gasskov (2002) concludes that 
sector training funds can provide an opportunity to develop national or sectoral training 
policies and activities. Based on an evaluation of Skillnets in Ireland, this may extend to 
other forms of network-based model. Here, the use of contestable funds aimed at groups 
of employers, has supported the creation of new industry, regional and cross-sector 
employer networks. Such networks may in turn be better able to collectively determine 
training needs and make provision more responsive. The process of open procurement of 
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training is also seen as supporting the customisation of training and can feed into the 
renewal of existing accreditation (Circa Group, 2012).  
In placing funding directly in the hands of employers, it is also considered likely that 
providers will need to develop innovative mechanisms for the delivery of localised and 
distance training (Parsons et al. 2006). There is also evidence from the UK evaluation of 
national skills academies. Based on 2,000 employer interviews, it is reported that employer 
engagement on the academy boards has contributed to training provision which 
corresponds to employers’ needs to fill skill gaps (Johnson et al. 2011). 
As a final consideration, as employers invest more in training and are increasingly required 
to pay the upfront costs for training, it is possible that more may seek to secure returns on 
these investments. Employer-routed funding and co-investment, may thereby lead to the 
unintended consequence of the increased introduction of payback clauses in employee 
contracts. In England the provision of such clauses are currently unregulated and left to 
each employer to decide upon (Cedefop, 2012). Alternative retention mechanisms may 
also be sought.22  
Key findings: There is some limited evidence of positive marginal impacts on productivity 
and wages from the additional training induced by co-funding instruments. While insofar as 
the schemes establish new or reinforce existing models of dialogue and engagement of 
employers in the training system, further qualitative benefits may emerge. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This section has focused on three overarching types of mechanism for delivering co-
funding incentives to employers: 
 Direct subsidies – grant payments and training vouchers; 
 Tax expenditures – tax allowances, credits, exemptions and reductions; and 
 Levy systems – levy- access, exemption, grant and reimbursement mechanisms 
The variety of tax expenditures, subsidies and levy-grant mechanisms adopted are 
fundamentally similar, insofar as they route government funding through employers. The 
extent to which their impacts differ is more often guided by the context in which they are 
delivered and the detail of specific conditions attached.  
The main conclusions from this chapter are that: 
                                            
22 Burke (2002) identifies several tools that may contribute to increase a firm’s ability to retain trained 
workers, while recouping the benefits of their investment. These include: contracts of employment such as 
apprenticeships; superannuation schemes; the provision of permanent employment; and career 
development structures. 
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 Governments around the world recognise the need to promote employer co-investment 
in training and employ a wide range of instruments to this end. 
 The receipt by employers of larger amounts of subsidy is associated with increased 
levels of investment in accredited training. The effects however tend to be differentiated 
by industry sector. 
 Achieving the balance between the targeting of additional outcomes and the 
administrative burden presents a real challenge. 
 Employer-routed funding may not be the most effective way to target training among the 
low-qualified and disadvantaged groups. Instead greater levels of employer co-
investment may reinforce the observed trend that the more highly skilled employees are 
more likely to receive training.  
 The use of existing infrastructure, and industry and locally-oriented support mechanisms 
can be useful to promote employer ‘buy-in’ and support SMEs in submitting claims for 
government funding.  
 Consideration of the wider issues of employer perceptions on the benefits of training 
and supply side conditions are needed – factors which are likely to differ on a sector-by-
sector, or even a firm-by-firm and individual basis. Caution is needed to limit negative 
substitution effects that may arise due to changes in the delivery of funding.  
Far-reaching conclusions are difficult to establish on the basis of a thin evidence base the 
findings of which are likely to be closely related to the nuances in approach and specificity 
of each instrument, as well as the wider context in which they sit. The sheer diversity in 
approaches one observes in itself suggests either that there is little consensus over what 
works or rather that it is the small details which matter. 
In order to dig deeper into the issues outlined above and draw out further lessons for the 
development and implementation of co-funding in an English context, chapter 3 presents 
the findings of in-depth case study analysis. Case studies were carried out to investigate 
the efficiency and effectiveness of subsidy, levy-grant, and tax instruments for co-funding 
in Australia, Ireland and the Netherlands respectively.  
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3 Case study analysis 
This section presents analysis of three case studies of co-funding 
schemes. The schemes were selected in order to identify the 
advantages and disadvantages of different approaches co-funding and 
draw lessons for the development and delivery of an English model of 
employer routed co-funding.  
Box 7: Summary of case study analysis 
Three different case study incentive schemes were selected in order to identify the 
advantages and disadvantages of different co-funding approaches: direct subsidy 
(Australia); levy system (Ireland), and; tax expenditures (Netherlands).  
Australia Apprenticeship Incentive Programme (AAIP) 
The AAIP is one element within a wider, evolving and complex system of incentives 
and support provided by the Commonwealth and State governments.  
The AAIP provides a staged, tax-free incentive to employers worth up to A$4,500 
(£3,000) in 2012. The incentive is designed to cover the costs for the employer of 
recruiting, employing and training an apprentice. It is paid for all apprenticeships, 
although payments vary depending on whether the employee is a new or existing 
worker, and whether the occupation is on the National Skill Needs List. Off-the-job 
training must be delivered through a Registered Training Organisation. Apprentices 
and their employers can also receive a range of other financial and pastoral support.  
Elements of the AAIP are also designed to create a more demand-led apprenticeship 
system, and a more responsive provider network.  
The benefits of the AAIP are: 
 High apprenticeship commencement rates. The AAIP has significantly 
increased employer take-up of apprentices.  
 High levels of satisfaction. Satisfaction levels amongst employers and 
apprentices are high.  
 High rates of progression into employment. Job outcomes of apprentices are 
high including those of targeted disadvantaged groups.  
However, the drawbacks of the AAIP are: 
 Low completion rates. AAIP completion rates are comparatively low.  
 Limited impact on competition between providers. A preference for traditional 
providers and high costs of market entry limits competition among providers.  
 Administratively complex. The AAIP is seen as an administratively complex 
and burdensome system of apprenticeship funding.  
Ireland Skillnets Training Network Programme 
Skillnets, like the AAIP, has been in existence since the late 1990s. Its main aim is to 
support and develop training amongst SMEs, especially amongst those who do not or 
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Box 7: Summary of case study analysis 
under-invest in training. It now covers both employees and jobseekers.  
There are currently 55 networks organised on a geographic, sectoral or cross-
sectoral basis. Skillnets match funds employer contributions (up to 50%) that are 
raised by a levy of participating employers deducted from the payroll. The networks 
identify training priorities for their members and use the funding to commission 
provision through a competitive tendering process. Network members can then 
access these programmes at a much reduced rate.  
Skillnets covers over 10,000 companies, of which half are micro businesses. Over 
42,000 people participated in one of the 5,700 training programmes. Three quarters 
of training was linked to the National Qualifications Framework or industry accredited, 
while one quarter were new programmes. 
The advantages of the Skillnets training network programme are: 
 Employer ownership. Skillnets is an employer-driven, flexible and needs based 
approach.  
 Added value. Skillnets is associated with relatively high levels of additionality, 
with training activities taking place that would not have occurred otherwise.  
 Development of formal training. The majority of training is formally accredited 
and certified. Open systems of procurement also promote innovative training 
responses that can be mainstreamed into the wider system. 
 Reduced administrative costs of training for employers. The costs of 
administering the training for individual employers are low.  
The disadvantages of Skillnets are: 
 It limits the duration of training. Skillnets has an annual budget which focuses 
attention on short training courses of less than one year.  
 Managing the networks is expensive. Managing the networks requires a 
number of dedicated full-time staff. 
 Employers are unaware of the true costs of training. Lack of awareness of a 
0.7 per cent levy on payroll means that many employers are unaware of the full 
amount they contribute towards the cost of training.  
 Emphasis on short courses. Annual budgeting requirements tend to favour 
short, standalone courses. This may preclude the extension of the scheme to 
more widespread and generic forms of provision such as apprenticeships. 
Netherlands Payment Reduction for Education (Wet vermindering afdracht, 
WVA) 
The Netherlands WVA was developed to compensate employers for the loss of 
working time of employees whilst they are training. It is one incentive amongst 
several intended to increase employer investment in training.  
Employers receive a tax credit if they invest in certain forms of training up to a 
maximum of €3,274 (£2,728) per employee. Initially aimed at intermediate vocational 
training (e.g. apprenticeships) the WVA now covers a wider range of training (ISCED 
levels 2-6). The tax credit is returned to the employer via the payroll tax system.  
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Box 7: Summary of case study analysis 
The system is administratively simple, supports all employers and a wide range of 
training as long as the qualification it is registered in the Central register of vocational 
training. Despite this freedom, about three quarters of the funds are spent on 
apprenticeship training, although the quality of training has been criticised.  
The advantages of the Netherlands WVA are: 
 It is administratively efficient. Programme administration costs are very low.  
 It supports employer co-investment in apprenticeships. Despite the freedom 
afforded to employers, most use the tax subsidy to fund apprenticeship training.  
 It has improved employer awareness and attitudes to training. It has 
encouraged employers, especially SMEs, to invest in training.  
The disadvantages of the Netherlands WVA are: 
 High levels of deadweight. Almost two thirds of companies would have provided 
the training in the absence of the tax subsidies. 
 Concerns over the quality of training. Independent evaluations have reported 
issues over the general quality of training due, in part, to the lack of quality 
guidelines.  
 The lack of control over total expenditure. This means there is no limit placed 
on the total amount of funding from the Exchequer.  
 Duplication of funding from other training schemes. Employers have been 
able to claim funding for trainees from multiple sources. 
Comparative assessment 
There are a range of mechanisms available with associated trade-offs in their 
strengths and limitations. These are often the result of trade-offs between particular 
aims and objectives as the administrative burden is a natural consequence of stricter 
quality controls or increased levels of targeting. Generally speaking, the more that 
quality controls or targeting is desired or considered necessary, the less it is 
appropriate to use the tax system to deliver employer-routed co-funding in training. 
In all cases, the financial incentives for employer investment in training cannot 
however be isolated from the wider topography of skills policies and programmes. 
Whichever delivery mechanism is adopted, employer ‘buy-in’ is vital. The acceptance 
for a given scheme and the corresponding willingness to invest time and money in it 
is also shaped by the economic climate as well as social norms and the perceived 
need for training. 
The role of price can also not be disassociated from the quality of provision and these 
social ‘norms’. Since these variables tend to differ amongst groups of employers, 
substitution effects are an inevitable consequence of any reform. Furthermore, 
although the case studies only place a limited amount of purchasing power in the 
hands of employers, the balance of evidence suggests that this is insufficient to 
deliver quality and responsive training on its own.  
In order to induce employers who do not usually invest in training, the case study 
evidence suggests that higher value incentives are required as well as mechanisms 
to shift the administrative burden away from business. 
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3.1 Case study selection and methodology 
The literature review identified more than 40 different incentive schemes in 24 countries 
(see table 2). Summary details of all of these schemes were presented to the BIS project 
steering group. In consultation with the steering group, a ‘long list’ of 13 schemes from 8 
countries were selected according to what extent and in what way they help to 
substantiate the expected benefits of a particular co-financing approach that is appropriate 
to England. However, no single scheme or model of co-funding matches entirely the 
guiding principles of a new delivery model of co-funding for FE and skills in England as 
identified in recent reviews and policy statements. Given this, five criteria were used to 
further refine the selection.23 This process culminated in the selection of three case 
studies in Australia, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
                                           
The in-depth case study research involved a further review of documentary evidence. This 
informed the development of semi-structured telephone interviews with country experts. 
The interviews focused on answering the research questions outlined in section 1.1 as well 
as identifying the practical challenges of implementation. A total of 14 interviews were 
carried out with research analysts, evaluators, policymakers, and employer and employee 
representatives.24 
 
23 The five criteria used were: 
Information - the availability of clear and well documented evidence of the co-funding model. 
Relevance - to policy priorities in England in terms of employer investment and employer engagement. 
Efficiency - where there is an efficient allocation of funding and low costs on the Exchequer. 
Effectiveness - evidence of net benefits for learners, employers, and the wider skills system. 
Replicability - to the English FE and skills training system.  
24 Full details on the method of case study selection and assessment are provided in Appendix 2. 
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3.2 International context 
Table 3: Summary employment and education statistics, 2011 
Country UK Australia Ireland Netherlands 
Population (15-64), million 41 15 3 11
Unemployment rate, % 8 5 15 4
Youth unemployment rate 
(15-24), % 20 11 30 8
Part time employment, % 25 25 26 37
High 35 38 40 33
Medium 44 35 39 42
Educational 
attainment, 
%25 
Low 21 27 21 25
Sources: OECD (2012a and 2012b); Note: All percentages are given as a share of the 
total labour force 
While England and the three case study countries witnessed a downturn in 2008 during 
the global financial crisis, the impact on unemployment across the 4 countries has been 
notably different. In Ireland and the UK, rates of unemployment - and youth unemployment 
in particular - are relatively high, in the Netherlands and Australia, unemployment rates 
were below 6 per cent in 2011.  
As well as low rates of unemployment, the Netherlands labour market is also characterised 
by relatively high rates of part-time employment (37 per cent of the total labour force) 
compared to rates of 25 per cent in the other countries in the analysis.  
In terms of the levels of educational attainment, the structure of the four economies is 
broadly similar. Although it is perhaps notable that in Australia more than 1 in 4 workers 
has attained only a low level of qualification (ISCED 0-2). 
With these contextual factors in mind, an overview of the assessed schemes is provided in 
table 4 below. The co-funding instruments and delivery models provide insight into the 
advantages and disadvantages of three different approaches to co-funding:  
 Direct grant payments to businesses for the purpose of training in Australia; 
                                            
25 Low qualifications correspond to ISCED levels 0-2, Intermediate qualifications to ISCED 3-4 and High 
qualifications to ISCED 5-8. An indicative mapping of the English education system against ISCED 2011 is 
provided in Appendix 3. 
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 A network based levy-access scheme in Ireland; and 
 A lump sum, wastable tax credit in the Netherlands. 
The selected approaches whilst not identical to the guiding principles of implementing co-
funding reforms can provide pointers as to the likely effectiveness of the co-funding model 
which is being considered in England. Table 5 below presents a comparative overview of 
the case studies analysed based on the six guiding principles outlined in the introduction to 
this research (see section 1.2.3). In short: 
 The Australian co-funding model is most similar to the prevailing model of co-funding in 
England. In addition, there are a range of direct incentive payments to businesses to 
offset part of the costs of apprenticeships and traineeships. The case study examines 
the effects of this partial employer-routed funding through a system of direct grant 
payments. 
 The Irish co-funding model is based on an employer-led approach to training provision 
that involves the use of market pricing mechanisms. The case study tests the principles 
of employer ownership of skills training. 
 The Dutch co-funding model provides employers with tax credits to cover part of the 
costs of training, while leaving the choice of provision to the employer. The case study 
analyses the effects of this partial employer-routed funding through the payroll tax 
system.
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Table 4: An overview of employer co-funding instruments in Australia, Ireland and the Netherlands 
Country Australia  Ireland  Netherlands  
Name of initiative Australia Apprenticeship Incentive 
Programme (AAIP) 
Skillnets training programme  Payment reduction for education 
(WVA) 
Instrument type Direct grant payment Network based levy-access scheme Lump-sum, non-refundable tax credit 
Timescale 1998 - present 1999 - present 1995 - 2013 (set to expire) 
Use of the tax system No Yes. Financed by tax levy on payroll Yes. Tax deductions on payroll 
Strategy New entrants and existing workforce Emphasis on existing workforce New entrants and existing workforce 
Level ISCED 3-5 ISCED 2-7 ISCED 2-8 
Target 
workforce 
Equity Indigenous population; disabled Jobseekers Jobseekers 
Firm No conditions No public or third sector organisations  Only accredited training enterprises 
Provider Only registered providers Unspecified – at employers’ discretion Only registered providers 
Trainee No age restrictions; new and existing 
workforce 
No age restrictions; new and existing 
workforce, and unemployed 
No age restrictions: new and existing 
workforce 
Conditions 
of funding / 
provision 
Training Apprenticeships and traineeships; 
external training only. 
No statutory training; aligned with 
identified needs. 
Internal and external training. 
Key provisions Up to A$4,500 (£3,000) per apprentice 
/ trainee. 
Employers contribute 50% of cost. Up to €3,274 (£2,728) per apprentice / 
trainee. 
Uptake of instrument 82 per cent Over 10,000 companies 80 per cent 
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Table 5: Comparative overview of co-funding delivery mechanisms 
 England Australia  Ireland  Netherlands  
Name of initiative The prevailing English model 
of co-funding. 
Australia Apprenticeship 
Incentive Programme (AAIP). 
Skillnets programme.  Payment reduction for 
education (WVA). 
Main instrument(s) 
for State funding 
Direct subsidy of providers; 
pilot training funds. 
Direct subsidy of providers. Contestable fund financed by 
a levy on firms’ payroll. 
Direct subsidy of providers; 
sectoral training funds. 
Instrument for co- 
investment 
Assumes the expected 
employer’s fee is collected. 
Direct grant to employers. Network membership fee and 
payment of training fees. 
Lump-sum, non-refundable 
tax credit. 
State funding 
routed through: 
Providers via the Skills 
Funding Agency. Limited 
employer routing. 
Providers via User Choice. 
Some employer routing. 
Employer-led networks. Providers from State budget. 
Some employer routing. 
Market value 
pricing 
Limited. Price mechanism for 
specialised / tailored training. 
Limited. Price mechanism for 
specialised / tailored training. 
Yes. Fees payable represent 
around 50 per cent of costs. 
Limited. Price mechanism for 
specialised / tailored training. 
Employer choice Yes. Provider funding follows 
the employer. 
Yes. Provider funding follows 
the employer. 
Yes. Network procurement of 
training. 
Yes. Training decision left to 
the employer. 
Output or outcome 
–oriented support 
Limited use of incentive 
payments. 
Additional incentive payments 
upon completion. 
Staged incentive payments 
based on performance. 
Full payment at outset until 
2012. No links to 
performance or quality. 
Accredited 
programmes 
Yes. Yes. Some. Around 70 per cent of 
training is accredited. 
Yes. 
Affordability and 
fiscal control 
Limited by annual budget. No overall programme limit. 
Limit for each training type. 
Limited by extent of levy 
finance and annual budget. 
No overall programme limit. 
Limit for each training type. 
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3.2.1 Australian Apprenticeship Incentive programme 
The Australian co-funding model is most similar to the prevailing model of co-
funding in England. In addition, there are a range of direct incentive payments to 
businesses to offset part of the costs of apprenticeships and traineeships. The case 
study examines the effects of this partial employer-routed funding through a system 
of direct grant payments. 
Context 
Although undoubtedly weakened as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis, the 
Australian labour market has remained relatively robust relative to other OECD countries 
(Giernalczyk, 2012, p. 6). In reflection of Australia’s relative economic resilience, 
maintaining and improving its competitiveness on the world market is an important current 
and future challenge. In parallel, the overall trend of an ageing population is thought to 
exacerbate this challenge as the existing workforce retires and skills are at risk of 
becoming obsolete (Hoeckel et al. 2008).  
The Australian VET system in adjusting and updating the skills of the existing workforce 
and those of new entrants has a key role to play in meeting two main challenges: 
maintaining and improving Australia’s competitiveness on the world market, and; meeting 
the ‘replacement demand’ of skills as older workers retire (Hoeckel et al. 2008).  
Both industry and trainees/apprentices have shown a high level of support for the VET 
system (NCVER, 2007a and NCVER, 2007b). There is direct employer involvement in 
developing the National Skills Needs List (NSNL) which is used by the Department of 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations to identify skills needs and bottlenecks 
(Australian Apprentices Taskforce, 2009).  
The most striking parallels between England and Australia are the priorities attached to: 
increasing overall skills, making the system more demand-driven and increasing 
competition amongst providers (OECD, 2009). As has traditionally been the case in 
England, apprenticeships are highly valued in Australia and as they provide a link between 
formal training and employment (IPPR, 2011). The high levels of Commonwealth and 
State investments reflect this. Their value is seen as having a dual purpose to benefit 
individuals and society ‘through the impact on two key drivers of economic growth – 
productivity and participation – and the impact on social inclusion’ (Deloitte, 2012). 
Furthermore, industry is now strongly involved in the definition of training needs and 
standards. The National Quality Council responsible for developing and monitoring the 
Australian Quality Training Framework is made up of representatives from government, 
industry groups, unions, employee organisations and training providers. 11 Industry Skills 
Councils collect information about industry training needs from employers, unions and 
professional industry associations (Giernalczyk, 2012).  
This has led to Australia’s VET system being characterised as a partnership between 
businesses and providers on the one hand and the national and state governments and 
government agencies on the other (Cully et al. 2009, p. 23). 
Reflecting the need to meet its skills challenges and increase the overall skills base, the 
government (Commonwealth and States) contribution to Australia’s apprenticeship and 
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traineeship system is substantial. The total cost to the public purse of a four-year 
apprenticeship in a recognised trade was estimated in 2008-09 at A$28,324 (£18,883)26 
and at A$7,081 (£4,721) for a one-year traineeship (NCVER, 2010a). The financial 
incentive to employers is worth up to A$4,500 (£3,000).   
Rationale of the Australian Apprenticeship training model 
The AAIP in its current form commenced on 1 January 1998, with the introduction of New 
Apprenticeships, which for the first time combined apprenticeships and traineeships. For 
the purposes of this case study the two types of training are together referred to as 
apprenticeships. Within the apprenticeship/traineeship categories, we will refer to the 
former as traditional apprenticeships as they mostly involve craft and skilled manual 
occupations.  
Traineeships were introduced in the 1990s to address high youth unemployment rates 
(Snell, and Hart, 2007). Similar to England, they expanded the apprenticeship model to 
sales, service and clerical occupations (Giernalczyk, 2012). Historically, the Australian 
conception of a traineeship emphasised the transition to employment of disadvantaged 
youth rather than skills acquisition but this is no longer the case (Committee of Inquiry into 
Labour Market Programs, 1985; Cully, 2008; and NCVER, 2010b). 
Traineeships generally have lower skill requirements and shorter periods of off-the-job 
training (Knight and Mlotkowski, 2009), and as a result usually last 1-2 years whereas 
traditional apprenticeships last 3-4 years. In addition, traineeships also tend to be 
delivered by private training providers whereas traditional apprenticeships tend to be 
delivered by Technical and Further Education (TAFE) institutions. They all lead to 
Certificates at Level III (ISCED 4 equivalent) on the Australian Qualifications Framework 
(AQF), or in the case of some traditional apprenticeships to certification at Level IV (ISCED 
5 equivalent).  
The nature of the AAIP apprenticeship has a number of similarities with apprenticeships in 
England: 
 An employer and an apprentice/trainee enter into a legal contract determining the 
training wage and conditions. The employer also defines an on-the-job and off-the-job 
training plan, endorsed by a Registered Training Organisation (RTO), and around 20 
per cent of time is spent in off-the-job training (Giernalczyk, 2012). 
 RTOs can be public or private as the training market has been opened to private 
registered RTOs and Group Training Organisation (GTOs) in order to increase 
competition in training markets (Giernalczyk, 2012).27 Most traditional apprenticeships 
are delivered by TAFE providers while traineeships are typically delivered by private 
training providers. 
                                            
26 Exchange rate of AU$1.5 = £1, based on average annual exchange rates for the year to March 2013 
(HMRC, 2013). 
27 As of 2012, out of the 5,000 RTOs in existence, 3,700 are private providers and the rest are public training 
providers, mainly TAFE institutes (Giernalczyk, 2012). 
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 There are no penalties if the employer or apprentice/trainee breaks the contract. An 
apprentice or trainee is thus not bound to the employer as was once the case, instead 
s/he is able to continue with another employer.  
 Access to Australian apprenticeships is not restricted by age, and from 2002 to 2008, 
more than 48 per cent of trainees were 25 years or older (NCVER, 2011a). 28 As in 
England, the large proportion of adult apprentices has been criticised as not in keeping 
with the notion of an apprenticeship as providing new skills rather than accrediting 
existing ones. 
 The apprenticeships also apply to new entrants and existing workers, working both full- 
and part-time. In 2008, 33 per cent of trainees were existing workers (those who were 
already employed by their current employer), while 37.2 per cent of trainees were 
employed part-time (Karmel et al. 2008).  
In this model, two agencies have been established to mediate and manage resources 
between employers, providers and the different levels of government: 
 Australian Apprenticeship Centres are contracted by the Australian government to 
administer incentive payments to employers and personal benefits to apprentices, assist 
in the signing of training contracts and generally promote apprenticeships in the local 
area. They are generally hosted by GTOs.  
 GTOs support the employment of apprentices and trainees for short and broken periods 
of employment notably where there are insufficient full time places available, especially 
amongst small firms (Giernalczyk, 2012). Their role is to select apprentices for host 
employers and to monitor the internal and external training, and as such GTOs reduce 
employers’ administrative costs and burdens and provides flexibility if an employer 
cannot support an apprentice for the whole period of the apprenticeship.  
 The UK Government has previously identified these agencies as effective at reducing 
the administrative costs of training and thereby relieving employers of a considerable 
burden. They are also seen as playing a particularly important role in supporting SMEs, 
which often lack the necessary capacities to identify and hire suitable trainees (House of 
Commons, 2012, pp. 43-46). 
Delivery of the co-funding model  
The physical flows of cash within the Australian system of apprenticeship training between 
the actors are illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
                                            
28 The proportion of apprenticeship starters aged 25 and over in England was 44 per cent in 2011/12 (Evans, 
2013). 
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Figure 3: Australian model of co-funding of training 
 
Source: developed by ICF GHK 
Key aspects of the co-funding model in Australia are: 
 Under the ‘User Choice’ policy, employers and their apprentices are free to choose the 
RTO for off-the-job training and this choice governs the flow of public funds to RTOs. 
This approach is similar to the prevailing English funding system which is also 
responsive to employer and learner training decisions. 
 The value of the corresponding provider-routed subsidies is also dependent on national 
skills needs, as defined by the NSNL. High priority skills areas receiving a full 100 per 
cent subsidy of the costs of training, and low priority skills areas receive match-funding 
on a 50 per cent cost basis.  
 State governments cover close to all the cost of the formal, off-the-job training delivered 
by private or public RTOs to apprentices and trainees (Deloitte, 2012). 
 GTO operations are jointly supported by the Commonwealth state and by territory 
governments as well as by a small charge paid by host employers.  
 The Commonwealth Government supports declared apprenticeships and traineeships 
through direct subsidies. Employers can claim these incentives subject to eligibility 
conditions such as the requirement that the training is certified. These subsidies are 
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intended to compensate employers for the non-training costs of hiring and supporting 
apprentices. Such incentives have become more tightly targeted on occupations in 
shortage.  
 In parallel, to the incentives provided to employers, States also generally exempt the 
wages of apprentices and trainees from payroll taxes. 
 Employers often pay tuition fees for their employees but ‘there is no ready way to 
estimate what proportion of fees this represents’. This direct contribution from 
employers is likely to be modest (Karmel and Rice, 2011). 
Incentive schemes under the AAIP 
The AAIP provides tax free incentives to the employer which effectively subsidise 
employer’s costs of employing, supporting and training an apprentice. These incentives 
are in addition to the overarching system of largely state-funded provision of off-the-job 
training. 
Incentives are paid in stages: at the commencement or recommencement (in the case of 
those returning to work-based training) and completion of the apprenticeship or 
traineeship, with larger amounts for apprentice completion of qualification (A$2,500, 
£1,667). There has been a shift from incentives being predominately paid on 
commencement to being predominately paid on completion (Deloitte, 2012). As of 2012, 
for ‘new worker’ and ‘existing worker’ apprenticeships (which appear on the NSNL), the 
ratio of payments is 38 per cent on commencement and 62 per cent on completion. 
 Additional incentives are also available to apprenticeships leading to one of the 57 
trades currently listed as national skill shortage occupations under the NSNL or which 
relate to targeted populations or areas: Mature Aged Workers Incentives (45 and over), 
Declared Drought Area Incentives, Rural and Regional Skills Shortage Incentive, 
Assistance for Australian Apprentices with Disability. 
 Apprentices also receive a range of financial and pastoral support to offset part of the 
effects of low wages during training, notably by supporting transport and 
accommodation costs, but these are beyond the scope of this study. 
An overview of some of the main incentives paid to apprentices is provided in Table 6 
below. 
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Table 6: Main incentives paid to the employer for Australian Apprentices29 
Employer Incentives 
(amounts shown in A$)30 
Certificate II 
(ISCED 3) 
Certificate III / 
IV, (ISCED 4/5) 
Diploma / 
Advanced 
Diploma, 
(ISCED 5) 
Commencement incentive 
 New worker 
 Existing worker - NSNL 
 
$A1,250 (£833)* 
nil 
 
$A1,500 (£1,000) 
$A1,500 (£1,000) 
 
$A1,500 (£1,000)+ 
nil 
Recommencement incentive  
 New worker 
 Existing worker - NSNL 
 
nil 
nil 
 
A$750 (£500) 
A$750 (£500) 
 
A$750 (£500)+  
nil 
Completion incentive 
 New worker 
 Existing worker - NSNL  
 Existing worker - Not 
NSNL  
 Part-time 
 
nil 
nil 
nil 
nil 
 
A$2,500 (£1,667) 
A$2,500 (£1,667) 
A$3,000 (£2,000) 
A$1,500 (£1,000) 
 
A$2,500 (£1,667)+ 
nil 
A$3,000 (£2,000)+ 
nil 
Source: Australian Government (2012) Notes: *Nominated Equity Groups only; +Where the 
qualification is in the aged care, childcare, or enrolled nurses sectors 
Assessment of impacts and experience to date 
Whilst commencement statistics have been considered as impressive (300,000 
commencements a year in a workforce of about 12 million (NCVER, 2011a), completion 
rates are low. Contract completion rates are around 45 per cent for trade and 52 per cent 
for non-trade occupations (NCVER, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c) – with considerable variation by 
occupation, as well as by employer size and the type of employer (private sector, group 
training organisations, and government employer).  
There are a number of reasons suggested for the relatively low completion rates. Firstly, 
the Australian VET system is modular and competence-based and thereby allows students 
to attend single courses without completing an AQF qualification. Nonetheless, high rates 
of attrition have remained a concern (Giernalczyk, 2012). 
                                            
29 Incentives are also available to provide additional support to workers in particular sectors or areas 
(Australian Government, 2012). Additional incentives paid to the employer may also be available at State 
level. 
30 Exchange rate of AU$1.5 = £1, based on average annual exchange rates for the year to March 2013 
(HMRC, 2013). 
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The retention/completion incentives provided are seen as ineffective. An econometric 
analysis conducted by Deloitte (2012) found that incentives under the AAIP31 were more 
effective in incentivising additional commencements than incentivising additional 
completions.32 The analysis also revealed that timing matters - an incentive targeted at 
young people has a larger effect at summertime, on account of the higher supply of 
potential Apprentices at the end of the school year. The impact of government incentives 
paid to employers has had a differentiated effect on traditional apprenticeships and 
traineeships. In the case of traditional apprenticeships, government incentives have been 
considered as negligible in comparison to the costs of taking an apprenticeship on. In 
some cases, employer incentives constitute as little as 2 per cent of those costs (Karmel et 
al. 2008). An NCVER case study on electrical and plumbing apprentices found that the 
largest part of costs for employers are apprentice supervision costs and as such that the 
effect of government incentives was minimal. Compared to traditional apprenticeships, the 
incentives for traineeships are financially more significant given the lower average wages 
and the shorter training duration (Deloitte, 2012). Thus under traineeships, incentives have 
acted as a significant subsidy on the total costs of training, and as such have significantly 
impacted on traineeship numbers (Karmel, et al., 2008).  
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of one particular incentive scheme from changes in 
larger macroeconomic variables and/or changes to other incentives schemes, including 
state-based ones (Deloitte 2012). In fact, economic, institutional and personal factors have 
a stronger influence (Karmel et al, 2008) than financial incentives on the take-up and 
completion of apprenticeships and traineeships. An economic downturn can lead to 
improvements in completion rates, as lack of alternative employment opportunities make 
apprenticeships attractive (NCVER, 2011d). Conversely, employers are likely to under-
invest in training during weak economic conditions in view of the lower labour demand 
(Deloitte, 2012).  
Employer size, management and recruitment practices (IPPR, 2011), and support 
mechanisms for the apprentice/trainee and the employer, such as mentoring and pastoral 
care, were important determinants of the quality of the apprenticeships and therefore of 
retention and completion. The fit between the apprentice and the employer or the 
occupation is also an important in the completion of the training (Deloitte, 2012).  
In terms of the quality of the training, the majority of employers and apprentices have been 
satisfied with the training received. Based on a 2009 employers’ survey, only 10 per cent 
of those with apprentices were dissatisfied with the training provided (NCVER, 2009).33 
Similarly high levels of satisfaction were reported by individual learners. According to the 
                                            
31 The report is limited to the presentation of results for the following employer incentives: Support for Mature 
Age Apprentices (SMAA); Support for Mid-Career Apprentices (SMCA); Support for Adult Australian 
Apprentices (SAAA); Apprentice Kickstart Bonus (AKB); and Apprentice Kickstart Extension (AKE). 
32 The econometric model developed revealed that all the incentives offering more than A$1,000 (£667) in 
the first year proved to have a significant, positive effect on commencements, other things being equal 
(Deloitte, 2012). 
33 A sample of 30 000 employers was selected from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Business Register. A 
total of 5 244 interviews were conducted with an overall response rate of 69.3 per cent. 
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2010 Apprentice and Trainees Destination Survey, 87 per cent of completers and 50 per 
cent of non-completers were satisfied with their apprenticeship (NCVER, 2010c).34  
Notwithstanding overall positive feedback on satisfaction over training provided and 
received, the quality of the traineeships is seen as a cause for concern. Increasing 
competition between providers through the User Choice policy has not been seen as 
effective in improving the quality of training provision. The desire of most states to maintain 
the viability of their TAFE institutions and high entry costs for providers, has limited the 
potential benefits of increased competition (Knight and Mlotkowski, 2009, p. 38). Experts 
believed that traditional apprenticeship delivery is relatively immune to competition as 
market entry costs are higher (for example, because traditional apprenticeships need more 
capital equipment). The fact that employers can ‘shop around’ for whichever provider they 
prefer has not impacted on the responsiveness of provision or quality for apprentices but 
has reduced the price of training trainees.  
In terms of impact on employment for graduates of apprenticeships, the employment rate 
of apprentices who completed their apprenticeship was 86 per cent. According to the 2010 
destination survey 71 per cent of those who completed training were employed in the 
same occupation as their apprenticeship (NCVER, 2010c). Although there are reported 
benefits to the targeted equity groups in terms of positive employment outcomes, it is likely 
- given the higher levels of support offered - that these benefits derive more from the 
specifically targeted individual support that they receive (Deloitte, 2012). 
Finally, experts were divided on the effectiveness of the AAIP in supporting skill shortage 
areas, with some pointing to increases / decreases in take-up as occupations were 
included or removed from the NSNL. Other experts, however, discerned no impact. The 
only independent research conducted into this matter found that a little over one-third of 
incentive payments went to skill shortage areas; and suggests that these provide 
insufficient incentive to translate into supply of workers in the areas of greatest skills need 
(Karmel et al. 2008). 
Overall, the Australian system of support for apprenticeships is seen as complex and 
administratively burdensome, particularly because there are several discrete components 
to it, Use Choice, NSNL, different incentives and different organisations (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2010). This is supported by experts interviewed. There are regular revisions to 
the apprenticeship system, especially during the current period as Commonwealth, state 
and territory governments seek to rein in public expenditure.  
Advantages and disadvantages of the co-funding instrument 
The main advantage of the AAIP is that that it has led to a rise in the number of Australian 
apprentices. 
 There has been a significant rise in the number of traineeships. Incentives towards 
traineeships have acted as a significant subsidy on the total costs of training, and as 
such have significantly impacted on traineeship numbers.  
                                            
34 A sample of 20,266 apprentices and trainees were selected with the aim of achieving 6 026 interviews. 
Interviews were completed with 6,228 apprentices and trainees with an overall response rate of 45 per cent. 
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 Whilst incentives for traditional apprenticeships are relatively lower, the AAIP has 
ensured the maintenance of the apprenticeship system in skill priority areas. The User 
Choice component of the AAIP has brought in a large number of new training providers 
into the market, albeit for delivering traineeships. There are high levels of satisfaction 
amongst employers and apprentices. 
The main disadvantages of the AAIP concern completion rates, quality and impact.  
 The impact of the AAIP on traditional apprenticeships is viewed as low due to the 
relatively low level of incentives compared to the large supervision and training costs. 
Other factors, such as, wages, employer size and wider macroeconomic variables are 
seen as having a greater impact on take-up and completion rates than incentives. The 
impact on skill shortage occupations is questionable and wider macroeconomic factors 
– international competitiveness and replacement skills demands - are seen as much 
more influential. Evidence on the overall quality of the traineeships is mixed with 
competition between providers through the User Choice policy has driven down costs of 
provision but not necessarily improved quality.  
 The AAIP is seen as a complex and administratively burdensome system. This is largely 
due to the number of discrete components such as User Choice, the use of the NSNL, 
and the wide range of different incentives and institutional organisations.  
Lessons from Australia 
There are many similarities between the aims and objectives, and components of the 
Australian and English apprenticeship systems. Therefore, the lessons from the AAIP as it 
has developed over a number of years are important learning points for the 
implementation of employer incentives/subsidies: 
 The trade-off between administrative simplicity and pursuing a wide range of objectives. 
The AAIP is seen as administratively complex but this is because it is trying to achieve a 
wide range of objectives: creating a more demand-led system; improving provider 
responsiveness; addressing national skills shortages; supporting apprentices across a 
wide range of diverse occupations and sectors. The balance in these priorities has also 
changed over time. For example, in the current economic downturn, value for money is 
seen as a major priority. In addition, jurisdictional differences (between Commonwealth 
and State level) and interventions and differences on those across States (wage 
subsidies, GTO funding, RTO funding) make for a more complex and administratively 
burdensome system.  
 Achieving greater provider responsiveness in a complex system. The institutional 
landscape is not only complex but also volatile. On the one hand, this reflects the 
innovative policy environment and responsiveness of the system to anticipated or 
identified challenges. On the other hand, the complexity of the Australian co-funding 
delivery system may make it more difficult for employers to access the support available 
and assess the labour market value of pursuing a particular qualification.  
 Matching incentives to cost differences in apprenticeships. Incentive payments for skill 
shortage areas have not translated into supply of workers to match these needs. 
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Incentives need to be sufficiently important to significantly subsidise the total costs of 
training. To this end, larger and more differentiated incentives may be needed which 
reflect the length and intensity of training as well as the wage differential on offer at the 
end of the apprenticeship or traineeship. Their size must therefore be tailored to reflect 
the relative benefits of different types of training and the total (direct and indirect) costs 
associated with these i.e. incentives should depend on the certificate category or the 
type of trade/occupation that the VET leads to. This need for differentiation is reinforced 
by the notion that providing incentives in all areas will dampen the effect of the price 
signal to undertake and complete training in an area of skill shortage. However, this 
would make the system even more complex and bureaucratic.  
 Balancing coverage and quality. Take-up of shorter traineeships has been positive but 
there are concerns over quality. A substantial increase in competition between training 
providers with expected improvements on the quality in services (as expected under the 
User Choice policy) has effectively been limited by TAFE’s predominance and high 
entry costs (e.g. capital equipment) for newcomers. This is more marked for training 
providers in the apprenticeships market.  
 The limited role of financial incentives to influence behaviour. Institutional and human 
resource management practices relating to recruitment, supervision and career 
development as well as personal factors have a stronger influence on training outcomes 
than financial incentives and need to be taken into account. Influential human resource 
or personal factors may for example include employers’ as well as apprentices or 
trainees’ attitudes and motivation as well as the levels of mentoring and support in 
place.  
 Targeting skill shortage areas. A key element of the AAIP is using incentives to address 
skill shortage areas. The process by which skills shortages are determined is seen as 
effective. However, it raises the broader question of why the state should intervene in 
supporting training where the returns for both the employer and the individual are 
greater than training in other skill areas. In addition, the fact that these are nationally 
determined leaves no flexibility for different skill shortages at a state level.  
 Using intermediary agencies to reduce the administrative burden on employers. 
Intermediary agencies such as GTOs can support employers in recruiting apprentices 
and in accessing external training provision and thereby relieve employers of a 
considerable administrative burden. 
3.2.2 Ireland Skillnets Training Programmes 
The Irish co-funding model is based on an employer-led approach to training 
provision that involves the use of market pricing mechanisms. The case study tests 
the principles of employer ownership of skills training. 
Context 
Ireland’s labour market is facing a number of related challenges following the dramatic 
setback of the global financial crisis in 2008. As a small, highly open and trade-dependent 
economy, Ireland’s ability to recover from the crisis depends highly on the future of its 
trading partners and their ability to recover (ESRI, 2013). Faced with rates of youth 
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unemployment around 30 per cent and continuing long term unemployment, achieving 
recovery in the labour market is seen as Ireland’s greatest challenge (DJEI, 2012).  
Although in general, the supply of labour is greater than demand, the 2013 Action Plan for 
jobs (DJEI, 2013) recognises that shortages continue to exist in certain areas (ICT, 
engineering, science, healthcare, finance). To contribute to this priority of employment 
growth, there is consequently a recognised need to better align skills to identified 
enterprise needs. Recognising this need, an extensive range of adult learning programmes 
is prioritised in the National Skills Strategy (EGFSN, 2005). 
As part of a wider agenda of structural reform to simplify the vocational training system in 
Ireland, FE (‘adult lifelong learning’) and vocational training (‘post-leaving certification 
courses’) are being brought together into a formal structure in 2013. This reform entails the 
dissolution of the National Training and Employment Authority (FÁS), and the 
establishment of a new Further Education and Training Authority (SOLAS). Further, the 
disparate set of Vocational Education Committees (VECs) are being restructured into 16 
Education and Training Boards (ETBs). Under the new reformed system, SOLAS will be 
responsible for the co-ordination and funding of training and further education programmes 
around the country, in a role similar to the Skills Funding Agency in England. ETBs will 
ultimately be responsible for the delivery of publicly-funded FE and training programmes 
(DES, 2012). 
In Ireland FE and vocational training take several forms (Cedefop, 2011c). These include: 
 Second chance/re-entry by adults into further non-tertiary or higher non-university level 
continuing education; 
 Ongoing publicly funded occupational and general skills training provided by public 
training and educational institutions; 
 Self-funded education and training and general part-time provision; and 
 Education and training for unemployed and inactive persons. 
Rationale of the Skillnets training network model 
The Skillnets Training Network Programme provides a means for groups of employers to 
contribute private funding and resources to support skills training of the labour force. 
Through the procurement of training the employer-led networks seek to also increase 
competition between providers of education and training and bring about innovations in 
training delivery and design that correspond to industry needs.  
The overall emphasis is on the delivery of training network plans and activities that 
address the needs of multiple companies. This focus of interventions towards groups of 
companies is consistent with a strategy to increase industrial and regional 
competitiveness. It is also consistent with the view that State support for training should 
focus on “general” training, rather than specialised training specific to the needs of a single 
company. 
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This remit has since been extended to offer network training opportunities to jobseekers 
with the aim of enhancing their employability (and thereby expand the pool of available 
labour). To this end, since 2011, networks are required to demonstrate that a minimum of 
10 per cent (and maximum of 30 per cent) of the total trained in each year are 
unemployed. In 2011, Skillnets was set overall targets of training 40,000 persons of whom 
8,000 are either unemployed or part-time workers (PER, 2011a). These targets were 
broadly achieved (Circa Group, 2012). 
Since 2011, the renewed mandate also aims to closely align network activities to strategic 
areas of emphasis based on the four themes illustrated in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Skillnets priority funding areas 2012/13 
  
Source: Skillnets (2013) 
Delivery of the co-funding instrument 
Since 1999, Skillnets has supported training networks that are mostly established by 
employers and organised on geographical, sectoral or cross-sectoral bases. The 
programme is based on a tripartite agreement between government, business 
representatives and trade unions.35 Consistent with a demand-led approach, companies 
                                            
35 The programme board includes ministerial representatives as well as representatives of the employer 
bodies, Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation (IBEC), Chambers Ireland, Construction Industry 
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and their employees are directly involved in the identification, design, delivery and 
evaluation of training processes either as lead bodies or in partnership with other 
organisations.36 
The physical flows of finance between the actors and programmes involved in Ireland’s 
Skillnets model of skills training are illustrated in Figure 5 below. 
Figure 5: Irish model of co-funding of training 
 
Source: developed by ICF GHK 
The government contribution to Skillnets, representing (at most) 50 per cent of the total 
costs of eligible network activities is funded through the National Training Fund (NTF). This 
funding represents just 4 per cent of the total value of the NTF.37 Notably, the training fund 
                                                                                                                                                 
Federation (CIF), the Small Firms Association (SFA) and representatives of employee bodies through the 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU). 
36 ‘Other organisations’ may include state agencies, advisory groups, certifying bodies, educational 
establishments, training providers and so on. 
37 The NTF instead largely funds the work of FÁS responsible for the delivery of apprenticeships, 
traineeships, and community training as well as employability programmes for the unemployed. 
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is budgeted separately from Voted Exchequer expenditure.38 Instead the levy receipts are 
maintained in an investment account and drawn down subject to agreement between the 
Minister for Education and Skills and the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform. 
Limits on maximum annual expenditure are also set in this process. 
The NTF is itself supported by a training levy on employers of 0.7 per cent of the payroll 
for eligible groups (covering approximately 75 per cent of employees).39 The compulsory 
levy is simple to administer as it is collected automatically through the Pay-As-You-Earn 
(PAYE) system. It was introduced at the same time as a simultaneous 0.7 per cent 
decrease in employer social security contributions. This approach averted any resistance, 
but also means that individual employers are largely unaware of their direct contribution to 
the NTF. 
Following the recession in Ireland, the level of state support to the network was reduced 
from a 75 per cent government contribution to a 50 per cent matched contribution. Under 
the current 2012-13 programme, Skillnets provides networks with up to 50 per cent of the 
cost of all eligible training activities, worth €15m (£12.5m).40 The total cost to the State is 
estimated at €289 (£241) per trainee (Circa Group, 2012). 
In reducing the level of government funding, no significant impact on the level of training 
activities was identified. That notwithstanding, the main casualty of the cutbacks has been 
the ability for new certified training programmes to be developed. These require greater 
government support as there is effectively ‘nothing to sell’ during the set-up phase. To fill 
this gap, two channels of further designated funding were established in 2011: 
 Future Skill Needs Programme - to develop courses for new skills in priority sectors;  
 New Certified Programme Development - to stimulate further investment in certification. 
These programmes provide additional government funding (of up to 80 per cent) to 
existing networks based on competitive proposals. This provides networks with a form of 
‘seed money’ or start-up finance to support innovations in training.  
Employer co-investment in training is a central part of the Skillnets co-funding model. 
Company funding at the level of the network contributed €10.5m (£8.75m) to accompany 
the €15m (£12.5m) of Skillnets funding in 2011. The main components of an individual 
network are as follows: 
                                            
38 Voted expenditure refers to the ordinary services of Government Departments and Offices, both capital 
and noncapital, the money for which is voted by the Dáil (the lower house of the Irish parliament) on an 
annual basis (PER, 2012, p. 5). 
39 The use of the payroll system to finance the NTF necessarily excludes the self-employed from contributing 
to the full costs of training. The self-employed remain eligible to participate in network activities. 
40 Exchange rate of €1.2 = £1, based on average annual exchange rates for the year up to March 2013 
(HMRC, 2013). 
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 Access to a contestable fund supported by matched funding from the State, with the 
possibility of ‘over-matching’ by the employer-led network. 
 Applications to funds are led by a contracting organisation that manages the network. 
These are typically groups of employers. 
 Network funding is confirmed on an annual basis, providing no guarantee of funds in 
year two. 
 Participating companies contribute match funding in the form of membership fees (an 
access levy) and payment of the fees set for the training courses. The precise ‘business 
model’ of the network is freely determined.  
 Membership fees payable either annually or monthly (via direct debit) enables networks 
to have some certainty over cash-flows and sends a signal of collective interest.  
 Flexible training fees ensures that the cost of membership remain accessible and allows 
companies to select training which meets their needs by creating a value proposition for 
the firm. 
 Roughly 80 per cent of the network costs relate to learning activities (trainer fees, 
training materials, evaluators, certification costs etc.), with the remainder spent on 
network events (seminars, conferences), communications (website, reports, publicity 
materials etc.) and management. 
 The network may also seek sponsorship of events / publications / websites to fund the 
non-training aspects of the network. 
 Networks issue calls for tender to procure training tailored to the identified needs for the 
sector /geography which it represents. 
Eligibility conditions and operational requirements 
Each network is approved a match-funding budget which covers the training costs plus the 
management of the network. In 2011, overall State funding on management costs was 
€2.1m (£1.8m). Each approved network has a maximum management ratio of 25 per cent 
of overall expenditure. 
Once an approved network begins to operate, there is a requirement to provide 
information on how the agreed budget is being spent and how the required cash matching 
is being collected. This is achieved through an online reporting system which is updated 
with details on income and expenditure. In addition to this on-going reporting requirement, 
funded networks must submit an Independent Accountants Report at the end of the 
funding period. This is used to demonstrate that all income and expenditure have been 
properly recorded and are eligible for inclusion. 
A dedicated Skillnets programme support manager works closely with a full-time Network 
Manager to support and monitor the performance of the network. Further quality 
assurance consists of a yearly compliance visit, data monitoring and auditing including 
checks on the eligibility of recorded incomes and the procurement process. 
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The following eligibility conditions apply to network funding: 
 Since 2009, government co-funding can only be used to fund the direct costs of training. 
In-kind costs were previously eligible, but this proved too complicated and difficult to 
police. 
 All match funding, including training course fees, is paid by the participating companies, 
not the employees. Job-seekers are also not required to contribute to the costs of 
network activities and therefore, this addition has meant that networks have needed to 
stretch the government co-funding further. 
 Public or voluntary sector entities are ineligible for Skillnets funding.  
 All types of training are eligible for support except for training that is mandatory by law.  
 Funding is made available through grants to approved networks enabling member 
companies to benefit from discounts on market training rates. 
 There are no formal restrictions on the types of provider which can deliver the training, 
other than those established at the network’s discretion. 
 Funding is provided to the networks in tranches: initial pre-financing (20 per cent), with 
the remainder payable in interim (40 per cent) and final (30 per cent) stages based on 
performance in relation to the targets established in the annual training plan. A retention 
payment (10 per cent) is payable at the start of the following period once accounts have 
been signed off. 
 All payments are subject to stringent conditionality requirements at each stage, relating 
to administrative, financial and reporting requirements, quality controls and performance 
measures. 
Assessment of impacts and experience to date 
Circa Group (2012) conducted an independent evaluation of the reported data and 
information from Skillnets proposals, Annual Reports and plans, and the on-line system for 
reporting activity management. This evaluation of activities in 2011 ‘generally confirms' 
that the Skillnets model is efficient in terms of resource deployment and effective in 
delivering the agreed planned outcomes (Circa Group, 2012, p. 116).  
There is however limited evidence of impact of the effectiveness of the achievement-based 
element of funding. Anecdotal evidence from programme managers however suggests 
that this is an effective tool to speed up operational compliance. Some degree of initial 
upfront payment is seen as necessary to enable sufficient investment in establishing and 
procuring training courses and prevent cash flow issues from being a deterrent to 
employer engagement. 
The employer-led network approach in Ireland has been successful in achieving its aims of 
increasing employer engagement and investment in training. In Ireland, where the funding 
for training is channelled through employer-led networks and the training decision steered 
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by the member companies, there is evidence of an associated greater take-up of training 
as almost 40,000 trainees participated in Ireland’s training network activities in 2011. 
Among the 70 training networks in operation in 2011, 10,151 companies were actively 
involved in a training network. Of these, over 90 per cent of the companies were SMEs, 
and roughly 50 per cent are microbusinesses employing up to 9 people (Circa Group, 
2012). The active participation of smaller firms is seen as testimony to the low 
administrative burden that the co-funding model places on the member companies.  
It is also suggested that the development of networks of SMEs and large companies on a 
local and sector basis, facilitates the transfer of knowledge between firms. At a high level, 
executives participate in the Steering Groups of networks to identify and specify training 
needs of the industry or region at large. Their interactions on these boards with trainers, 
academia and other advisors, and the support of the Programme Support Officers can also 
promote the sharing of best practices. On the ground, the joint participation in training 
activities of employees from a range of companies and jobseekers can also promote the 
knowledge transfer. There is however only anecdotal evidence of such positive impacts. 
In the current 2012-13 period, 55 training networks operate across Ireland, down from the 
70 networks in operation in 2011. This reduction is largely a result of network mergers 
based on an appreciation of common cross-industry or inter-regional challenges and 
needs. Moreover, mergers arise in order to take advantage of economies of scale – both in 
terms of managing the administration and in terms of the volume of training activities. 
In 2011, nearly 5,700 courses were undertaken and over 42,000 individuals received 
training, 16 per cent of which were jobseekers. This surpassed the established 
government target of training 40,000. In light of the cuts in the government contribution 
(from 75 to 50 per cent of costs), the resilience of employer investment in training reflects 
the success of the programme in leveraging (and retaining) employer ‘buy-in’. Interviewed 
experts suggest that the accumulated employer experience of the benefits of training from 
previous funding rounds was a determining factor. 
In the most recent independent evaluation of the Skillnets programme, online surveys 
were conducted involving 86 per cent of network managers, 15 per cent of trainees and 
just 8 per cent member companies (Circa Group, 2012). The findings here corroborate the 
perception that employers experience benefits from the training that they pay for (at 
subsidised rates). A large majority of respondent companies reported to be satisfied or 
very satisfied with the quality of the training, its relevance and its cost. Trainees also 
reported high levels of satisfaction with the training courses and agreed that it ‘helped 
them do their job better and will continue do so in the future.’ 
From a government perspective, the intention is to support training that would not have 
happened otherwise. Based on employer feedback, the evaluation reports low levels of 
deadweight – a large majority of employers would have ‘otherwise trained less or not at all’ 
(Circa Group, 2012). The government contribution to financing skill needs is seen by the 
interviewed stakeholders as a necessary condition for including support to the 
unemployed, as well as more basic forms of entry-level or low level skills training as part of 
network activities. There is little evidence to suggest that firms are wary of investing in 
accredited training due to the consequent portability of these skills, and thereby 
engendering a fear of ‘poaching’. On the contrary, accreditation may be perceived as a 
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sign of quality training (and therefore potential employer returns). The framing of the 
training as a means to promote industrial competitiveness of the region or industry sector 
groupings may also serve to foster a collective interest in training. 
Perhaps more importantly given the aim of the programme to support training applicable 
across multiple companies, 74 per cent of all training activities undertaken in 2011 were 
linked to the National Framework of Qualifications (NFQ) or industry certified accreditation. 
25 per cent of training courses delivered were instead entirely new programmes, providing 
evidence that the networks contribute to innovation in training provision (UKCES, 2009). 
For example, new tertiary level vocational qualifications have been developed in 
Sustainable Energy Finance (Summit Finaus Network, 2013).  
Interviewed stakeholders report that the improved access to accredited training is 
particularly beneficial for certain sectors. In particular, those service industries with a 
previous emphasis on non-formal training, such as hotels and catering. Anecdotal 
evidence also suggests that as employers engage in the network model and invest in 
training, issues over the quality and relevance of training becomes more important over 
time. 
A further benefit of the employer-led network approach is purported to be the purchasing 
power that the networks derive. The process of procuring training appears to have a 
positive influence on customising training to suit the needs of employers: 80 per cent of 
courses run were adapted to the needs of networks (UKCES, 2009). 
In the 2011 evaluation, Circa Group (2012), almost all of the companies agreed that the 
training has helped them to fill skill gaps, whilst a similarly large majority agreed that it has 
contributed to improved productivity. A high proportion of respondents also reported that 
Skillnets training contributed to market developments such as enhancements to products 
and services. In some cases, employers also reported that the training received (and the 
networking opportunities provided therein) has helped them to expansion in existing 
markets or entry into new markets. 
An overview of the inputs, activities, outputs and estimated impacts based on the 2011 
independent evaluation are presented in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: Evaluation of the Skillnets programme 
 
Source: adapted by ICF GHK from Circa Group (2012) 
Advantages and disadvantages of the co-funding instrument 
The advantages of the Skillnets programme are: 
 Employer-driven, tailored training is based on identified industry needs. This contributes 
to promote greater relevance and timeliness of training. The demand-led approach and 
lack of restrictions on the nature of provision, promotes the piloting of new, innovative 
training and delivery methods.  
 Close cooperation between the social partners, providers and government actors and 
the introduction of a dedicated stream of funding supports the renewal of existing 
accreditation. 
 The multi-employer training model reduces administrative costs – which helps SMEs 
who may otherwise lack in-house capacity to train or suffer from cash flow problems to 
cover the full upfront costs of training. SMEs, in particular, also benefit from the 
increased bargaining power vis-à-vis training providers. Finally, all firms benefit from 
‘network effects’ of knowledge transfer. 
 The continued operational success of the programme when the Government’s share of 
co-funding decreased from 75 to 50 per cent is testament to the ability of the model to 
leverage employer ‘buy-in’. 
 The eligibility criteria ensure that the needs of jobseekers, more basic, low-level skills 
needs are explicitly addressed as well as the need for more technical skills.  
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 At the level of the NTF, further advantages are derived from the fact that spending does 
not need to be voted on. This provides flexibility to respond to urgent needs and review 
programme funding mid-year. There is also minimal administrative burden on employers 
as the levy is deducted directly from payroll.  
The disadvantages of the Skillnets programme are: 
 Annual award of grant finance all but rules out use of the scheme to develop training 
responses of a longer duration. This leads to an overwhelming emphasis on short or 
standalone courses and may preclude the extension of the scheme to more widespread 
and generic forms of training provision such as apprenticeships. 
 While the burden on employers is kept low, the administrative burden at the level of the 
networks and on government is significant. As such there is risk of non-essential 
bureaucracy. It can also be timely and costly for new networks to establish employer 
‘buy-in’ to its business model since it is more difficult to sell a concept than a product. 
Managing the networks in order to mitigate this administrative burden requires the 
funding and creation of permanent positions.  
 Continuous monitoring and evaluation is also required to avoid issues of provider non-
compliance. This is needed to mitigate the risk of providers defrauding networks by 
charging high rates for customised training. As such, providers are now required to 
justify any charges and may be subject to spot checks or random inspections. 
 At the programme level, employers are largely unaware of the 0.7 per cent levy on 
payroll which directly contributes to the NTF. While this reflects a minimal administrative 
burden on the one hand, it also reflects a lack of employer awareness of the full costs of 
training.41  
 A disadvantage of funding training through the NTF, which is essentially a form of 
hypothecated tax, is that the available revenue is pro-cyclical: the higher the level of 
employment, the higher the revenue that is available. This generates the risk that less 
funding is available in a downturn.42 
Lessons from Ireland 
The Skillnets approach is to develop an infrastructure of employer ‘buy-in’ alongside a levy 
system which is matched by government funding. This has important lessons for similar 
approaches which are being trialled in England, for example, through the Employer 
Ownership Pilot. The main lessons from Ireland Skillnets network approach and the 
National Training Fund are: 
                                            
41 Employer associations are however aware of this levy and their representation on the board may help to 
ensure the funding is directed to where it is considered most needed. 
42 This is somewhat restricted by any limits placed on the fund in the annual budgeting process, and could in 
theory, be overcome by implementing a rule to ensure that government’s percentage contribution increases 
in an economic downturn. 
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 The impact of employer engagement on quality. Employer ownership and procurement 
is widely perceived as having had a positive impact on the quality of training and 
relevance to employer and wider industry needs in terms of both its content and 
delivery. Open systems of procurement can also promote innovative training responses, 
which can be mainstreamed into the wider system. This is however conditional on 
employers being aware of what their collective short- and long-term needs are and their 
ability to communicate or signal these needs to providers. Employer involvement in the 
design and administration of co-funding is also associated with a greater willingness to 
train.  
 Involving the social partners. Employer representatives and trade unions can be used to 
support firms in analysing training needs and developing training plans. Employers with 
limited experience of training, in particular may require such support in order to identify 
their skill needs, establish a training budget or plan and communicate their needs to 
providers. 
 Leveraging greater employer investment. Employer ‘buy-in’, developed through positive 
experiences and perceptions of training, is necessary for the introduction of price to not 
be seen as a further deterrent or barrier to training. Once employer ‘buy-in’ has been 
achieved, there may be potential to leverage further employer investment. 
 The use of networks to reduce the administrative costs to employers. Networks or group 
training that can pool together employers can help SMEs achieve a stronger bargaining 
position vis-à-vis training providers Networks of employers have greater bargaining 
power with providers. The networks reduce the administrative costs of training and 
thereby relieve employers of a considerable burden. 
 Conditional finance can support timely operational compliance. Some upfront support 
may be necessary in order to avoid cash-flow problems. ‘In-kind’ match funding was 
found to be too complicated and difficult to police. Small firms may struggle to finance 
training at market value due to cash-flow issues and may require further upfront 
support. Upfront support may also be needed to support employer engagement in 
establishing and/or the renewal of training programmes, as for providers there is 
effectively ‘nothing to sell’ during the set-up phase. 
 The continued need for government support. A government contribution is necessary to 
assist the management of the networks. It is also necessary to support the training of 
target groups such as jobseekers and the low-skilled. 
 The potential administrative efficiency of a payroll levy. A compulsory levy arrangement 
need not be intrusive. The training levy’s introduction led to no net change in tax 
requirements. This presents a minimal administrative burden of collecting the levy and 
help ensures a smooth path to its introduction. This does however contribute to limited 
awareness of the levy contribution among employers. 
 Budgetary processes affect the types of training which can be supported. Annual 
budgeting requirements favour short courses up to a maximum of 1 year, and generally 
preclude training provision of a longer duration. While supporting a prudent use of 
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finances, annual budgeting processes and caps may respectively preclude the 
development of training courses that last longer than a year and ultimately limit the 
scale of the programme. 
3.2.3 Netherlands Payment Reduction for Education 
The Dutch co-funding model provides employers with tax credits to cover part of 
the costs of training, while leaving the choice of provision to the employer. The case 
study analyses the effects of this partial employer-routed funding through the 
payroll tax system. 
Context 
The well performing labour market in the Netherlands has continually delivered relatively 
low rates of unemployment, even during the global financial crisis in 2008. The Dutch 
labour market is however ‘divided into a small flexible segment and a large more rigid 
segment’, with limited job security for the former. At the same time, rates of labour 
utilisation are relatively low due to a high frequency of part-time employment and a low 
effective retirement age (Gerritsen and Hoj, 2013). 
For those employed in the more rigid segment the combination of employment and wage 
protection legislation (which increase with age) gives individuals strong incentives to retain 
the same job as long as possible, this has the effect of reducing the return on (non-firm 
specific) human capital accumulation (Gerritsen and Hoj, 2013). As a result, 39 per cent of 
all employees are involved in training - which is more than are involved in training in the 
UK (31 per cent) - but still only half the share observed in Denmark, and Sweden (Euwals 
et al. 2009). 
In the Netherlands, collective labour agreements play an important role in providing and 
financing further training. Financial arrangements in collective agreements are made 
through funds which are intended to keep the skills and competences of employees at a 
high level. The most prominent of these funds are the sector based training and 
development funds (‘Opleidings- en Ontwikkelingsfonds’, O&O funds), which are typically 
financed through a levy on the gross wage bill of the firms in the respective sector. These 
funds mainly focus on informally acquiring sector specific skills, instead of accredited 
general training that can facilitate labour mobility between sectors and particularly out of 
declining sectors (Gerritsen and Hoj, 2013). 
Since training is typically a joint decision in the Netherlands between employers and 
individuals, employer incentives should also be considered in view of the institutional 
framework underpinning this decision making process. In the Netherlands this includes 
training leave arrangements, and other individual incentives, such as individual learner 
accounts. 
Rationale of the Payment Reduction for Education model 
In 1998, the law for tax relief for training costs – Payment Reduction for Education (‘Wet 
vermindering afdracht loonbelasting en premie voor de volksverzekeringen’, WVA) - was 
adopted as part of a broader law reducing remittance tax and national insurance 
contributions. The package included two other types of tax deductions for training 
investments including a tax law allowing 40 per cent deduction on training expenditures for 
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workers above age 40, which was abandoned in 2004 due to the unintended substitution 
effects (Leuven, Oosterbeek, 2004).  
The WVA introduced a tax credit paid via payroll to cover part of the costs of a worker, a 
trainee or a student-employee participating in certain types of education or training. The 
purpose of the tax credit is to persuade more employers to invest in vocational training. 
The policy was adopted at a time when vocational training was not high on the agenda for 
employers, due to a lack of influence on training content and the general quality of training. 
Alongside the introduction of the WVA were reforms of VET system in order to address the 
employer responsiveness and quality of training.  
In principle, the WVA seeks to compensate employers for the costs they incur due to the 
loss of working time of the employee. The relief is not intended to directly cover the costs 
spent for training courses, which employers are expected to bear. Investment and co-
funding in training is seen as strategic tool by governments and employers to increase 
international competitiveness (Berkhout et al. 2012; Leuven, Oosterbeek, 2004).  
Delivery of the co-funding instrument  
Figure 7 below sets out the model of co-funding together with additional subsidies that can 
be claimed by the employer via sectoral training funds to pay for specific training courses. 
Figure 7: Dutch model of co-funding of training 
 
Source: developed by ICF GHK 
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Alongside the incentives aimed at employers (outlined below), the Government subsidises 
regional training centres (‘Regionaal Opleidingen Centrum’, ROCs) by approximately €3m 
(£2.5m) each year. The amount paid to individual ROC depends on the number of 
students enrolled each year and the range of courses offered. 
Employer subsidies and support for training may also be available from the sector-based 
O&O funds, most of which focus on formal sector-specific training courses. There are also 
sectoral O&O funds that solely distribute European Social Fund (ESF).43 In some sectors 
the subsidies for training coming from O&O funds can be quite substantial, for example in 
the metal sector the O&O fund provides a subsidy per employee of up to €1,500 (£1,250) 
(Donker van Heel et al. 2008). The O&O funds and other available subsidies are 
compatible and complementary with the wastable (non-refundable) tax credit. In effect, the 
employer can claim multiple subsidies for the same trainee. 
According to the National Statistics Office (‘Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek’) the 
government funds 61 per cent of the shared costs for apprenticeship (‘Middelbaar 
beroepsonderwijs’, MBO, ISCED level 3-4) training, with 33 per cent funded by the 
companies and 6 per cent by households (Vogler-Ludwig et al 2012). Employers pay an 
unspecified amount to training providers for work based vocational training pathway 
(‘Beroepsbegeleidende Leerweg’, BBL)44 and school based vocational training pathway 
(‘Beroepsopleidende Leerweg’, BOL),45 though the amount is rather small and does 
generally not exceed the €1,000 (£830) limit. 
Studies have found (Detmar and De Vries, 2006) that companies overall expenditure for a 
BBL trainee in 2005 was €11,556 (£9,630) and in 2008 the amount rose to €12,213 
(£10,178). During this time, the maximum amount of the tax relief was €2,566 (£2,138). 
The tax subsidy therefore represents around 15-20 per cent of the total costs of work-
based apprenticeship training. 
Tax relief and employer training costs 
The wastable tax credit is essentially a lump sum grant payment that gets delivered 
through the payroll tax system. The amounts that can be claimed vary according to the 
type of training, in reflection of the different levels of associated direct and indirect costs. 
This channel for employer-routed funding is additional to the direct public funding of ROCs. 
The scope of the WVA has been revised over the years, and at the outset, the WVA was 
mainly applicable to apprenticeships or higher secondary school vocational training 
                                            
43 In total, out of the 80 O&O funds representing 78 per cent of workers, 78 per cent of the funds provide 
subsidies for training activities, in one way or another. A complete list of all available O&O funds is available 
at Agentschap SZW (2013). 
44 Trainees work 60 to 80 per cent of the time training on-the-job and the rest of the time in a public or private 
vocational training school. 
45 Trainees spend 20 to 60 per cent of their time at a company for practical learning and the rest of the time 
at a public or private vocational training school. The student/or school can choose whether the student will 
spend 1 day at the company each week or whether block internships will be done over the whole period of 
training. Training will last between 1-3 years to reach level 4. 
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(‘Middelbaar beroepsonderwijs’, MBO, ISCED level 3-4) and has been successively 
extended to include further types of job-related training and lifelong learning. Table 7 
shows the applicable maximum deduction amounts per student per year in 2013. 
Table 7: Tax credits available for training under the WVA 
Eligible type of training ISCED 
level 
Value 46 
Basic qualification level (unemployed) 2 €3,274 (£2,728)
Lower secondary vocational training (‘Voorbereidend 
Middelbaar Beroepsonderwijs’, VMBO) 2 2,728 (£2,273)
Procedure recognising acquired professional 
competences (‘Erkenning Verworven Competenties’, EVC) - €327 (£273)
Work- and school-based vocational training pathways 
(‘Middelbaar beroepsonderwijs’, MBO) 2-4 €2,700 (£2,250)
Initial tertiary vocational training (‘Hoger 
Beroepsonderwijs’, HBO) 5 €2,700 (£2,250)
Doctoral training paths (PhD) 8 €2,728 (£2,273)
Source: Government of the Netherlands (2013)  
The rates in Table 7 are used to calculate a reduction in the employer’s payroll tax, 
depending on the level and duration of training, and how many hours the employee works. 
An example calculation is provided in Box 8 below. 
                                            
46 Exchange rate of €1.2 = £1, based on average annual exchange rates for the year up to March 2013 
(HMRC, 2013). 
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Box 8: Calculating the tax relief 
Example 1 
Suppose that the employee follows higher vocational training in the course 'HBO 
Communication' for example. The employee is not enrolled as a full-time student and 
it is a three year degree.  
The employee is employed for 24 hours a week. The part-time factor is 24/36 (full-
time). The tax reduction for education is therefore an annual lump sum payment of 
24/36 x €2,700 = €1,800 (£1,500).  
The tax credit should normally be applied for 24 months, but due to the employee 
working part-time, the claiming period is extended to 36/24 x 24 months = 36 months. 
The employer can claim a deduction for three years of €5,400 (£4,500).  
Source: adapted by ICF GHK from NTI (2013) 
 
Eligibility conditions 
In order to claim the tax credit, the employer is required to make a simple request to the 
tax authorities when submitting payroll slips, at any time of the year. The eligibility criteria 
tend to be unrestrictive: 
 There are no restrictions regarding the type of company (except for the HBO training 
which is limited to specific sectors).  
 The student needs to have a trainee-employment contract and a training agreement 
signed by the training provider, the trainee and the employer indicating the diploma to 
be reached and courses to be followed. 
 For students in the MBO pathway, the employer has to be recognised as a company 
that can train students by one of the 17 sectoral training bodies (‘Kenniscentra 
Beroepsonderwijs’) that determine the training topics and standards for the MBO 
diplomas for each profession. This requires some investments in personnel who are 
responsible for supporting and supervising future apprentices. 
 The work-based (BBL) diploma is particularly flexible regarding the practical learning 
content within companies and the courses to be followed in the school – with various 
combinations possible. 
 The course delivered by the training provider must be registered in the Central register 
of vocational training (‘Centraal register beroepsopleidingen’), which includes all training 
courses recognised by the Ministry of Education or Economy.47 
                                            
47 In the Netherlands there are 43 specific regional training centres (ROCs) which have this accreditation, 
along with some other private schools. The content of the training is fixed by the Ministry of Education and 
the sectoral training bodies – which include social partner representatives in their advisory board. 
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For other types of training no accreditation is needed although the sectoral O&O funds 
may establish industry level accreditation for specific training courses for adult education. 
Most of the ROCs also have a private training institute or commercial department through 
which they provide continuing adult training programmes. Control is not always ensured 
whether these private institutes or subcontracted training experts dispose of state 
accreditation. 
In case of controls by the tax authorities the employer needs to retain a number of 
documents including the trainee-employment contract, the training agreement, a certificate 
that granting permission to train students and proof that the employee actually followed the 
training. 
Assessment of impacts and experience to date 
The Dutch Ministry of Education has commissioned two evaluations for the periods 2000-
2005 (Gelderblom, 2007), and 2006-2011 (Berkhout et al. 2012).  
The overall aim of providing more apprenticeship places over time was effectively reached. 
From 2007 to 2011 approximately 20 per cent more enterprises were accredited to 
undertake vocational training and 53 per cent more funded apprentices (Berkhout et al. 
2012). Whether the increase of number of places is an effect of the tax relief itself is 
however difficult to assess. 
The tax authorities have not kept exact data on the proportion of funding received by the 
various types of training but it is estimated by the government that approximately 75 per 
cent of the claimed tax credits was spent on apprenticeship (MBO) pathways.48 Under this 
pathway, 28 per cent of students are below 18 years while 72 per cent of students are 
aged over 18. It therefore follows that most of the claims are likely to relate to lifelong 
learning and adult apprenticeships. BBL – MBO level 2 funding can also be used for the 
unemployed that need the diploma to enter the labour market. In such cases the employer 
is able to effectively combine funding from the two tax credits which doubles the maximum 
level of the tax deduction. 
To establish the impact of the WVA on employer investments in training, Gelderblom 
(2007) interviewed more than 1,300 companies. The evaluation suggests that the tax 
credit provides an incentive to take-up apprenticeships among SMEs. In particular, the 
incentives were found to have a positive impact on the uptake of training when there are 5 
or more trainees per company, and lower level qualifications are pursued, such as the 
VMBO diploma.  
The fiscal incentives have less effect on training outcomes the higher the level of 
qualification and the larger the company. In practice, companies still chose not to train 
lower skilled apprentices or students with learning difficulties since this typically incurs 
additional costs of supervision and mentoring. In general, companies chose trainees very 
carefully, taking into account the overall costs of the training (Gelderblom, 2007). 
                                            
48 It is notable that while the BBL route to apprenticeships accounts for the largest share of funding, it is not 
the most common type of MBO pathway chosen by students. Instead the majority follow the BOL pathway. In 
2011/12, two thirds of MBO students registered for school-based routes (BOL). 
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During the period 2006-11, Berkhout et al. (2012) report that the amounts claimed by 
social work, healthcare and temporary agency workers rose most over the evaluation 
period. De Jong (2012) estimates that the average amount spent on training on individual 
employees in these sectors increased from €681 (£568) to €1,152 (£960) from 2009 to 
2012. The WVA instrument may help to explain part of this increased employer 
investment, as around a quarter of temporary workers follow BBL apprenticeships. The 
O&O fund for the temporary agency workers however increased substantially over the 
evaluation period. Here, subsidies accounted for 28 per cent of the agency costs for 
training in 2012 compared to 15 per cent in 2009 (De Jong, 2012).  
According to the interviewed experts, businesses greatly appreciate the public support 
provided though the WVA tax credits. It is also believed to have influenced the current 
level of BBL apprenticeships (Gelderblom, 2007). Though the tax credit is associated with 
higher rates of training, high levels of deadweight are reported. More than half of the 
interviewed companies reported that they would have provided the same amount of places 
without the WVA. The largest effect was confined to sectors such as construction, 
hospitality, and the car industry. Here, the number of trainee places provided is driven 
primarily by the general economic situation rather than the incentives on offer 
(Gelderblom, 2007). 
The WVA has had little positive impact on the quality of training provision. It may however 
have contributed to the quantity of training providers. While there was a 20 per cent rise in 
the number of companies that are accredited training providers, compliance issues and 
displacement effects have been noted. Berkhout et al. (2012) identifies an increase in 
claims for BBL training occurred while the numbers of students following BBL training 
remained the same or even decreased. This leads to the conclusion that claims under 
WVA for BBL trainees were used for ineligible training activities, such as general language 
courses (Berkhout et al. 2012). 
This displacement was able to occur due to the absence of any rigorous quality criteria. 
Within the WVA, training providers are accredited by the sectoral training bodies and the 
Ministry of Education but only on the hours of training and some obligatory content. The 
quality of the content is not accredited as such, nor is the composition of the training 
specified.49 Furthermore, the tax authority does not control whether the training followed 
actually leads to a successful higher qualification level. Berkhout et al. (2012) report that 
the training providers did not always provide for high quality standards or deliver training 
that led to further qualification. 
In the absence of a cap on overall expenditures, the government’s total fiscal liability for 
the WVA significantly increased between 2001 and 2011. By 2011, claims had more than 
doubled to €387 million (£323m) compared to €198 million (£165m) in 2002. According to 
the Dutch Ministry of Finance analysis (see table 8), in the absence of further reforms the 
budget cost of the tax credits are projected to increase to €436 million (£363m) by 2017. 
                                            
49 The Ministry of Education has set out an action plan for the period 2011-2015 to improve the quality of the 
diplomas in MBO pathways. 
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Table 8: Tax expenditures and projections under the WVA, 2001-2017 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  2017* 
Tax 
claimed, € 
millions 
198 210 201 187 202 25 306 361 386 387  436 
Claiming 
companies, 
000s 
: : : : 30 36 38 40 42 42  : 
Sources: Gelderblom (2007) for period 2000-2005; Berkhout et al. (2012) for period 2006-
2011; *Ministry of Finance projections, (:) no data available. 
Berkhout et al. (2012) provides two reasons to explain the steady annual increases in the 
WVA budget. Firstly, information campaigns carried out in the period 2006-2011 generated 
greater interest from employers for investment in training. Secondly, whilst companies’ 
budgets for training have decreased during the recent economic crisis, their will or need for 
training is thought to have stayed the same. Therefore it is likely that the tax credit has 
helped to maintain a culture of training during the downturn.  
The 2006-11 evaluation found that the number of companies claiming the WVA with 
increased the most amongst those with annual wage costs in excess of €1 million (by 46 
per cent in the period 2006-2011). Furthermore, the number of companies claiming more 
than €1 million under the WVA each year had increased from 8 to 21 companies in the 
period 2006-2011. This means that some individual companies benefited substantially 
from the tax credit. 
At the end of 2012 the Dutch Government decided that the WVA will be abandoned from 
the end of 2013. The government is currently discussing the introduction of a subsidy 
instrument in order to more carefully monitor public budgetary costs spent under the 
WVA.50  
Advantages and disadvantages of the co-funding instrument  
The main advantages of the Dutch tax credit are: 
 The WVA is efficiently administered through the payroll tax system. In addition, there is 
no delay in receipt of the credit since requests can be made at the same time the 
training starts. 
 The tax credit has had a positive impact on SMEs as it often represents a substantial 
share of the relative wage costs for a trainee. 
                                            
50 The new subsidy is likely to be similar in nature to that of a previous initiative, Subsidy for Apprenticeship 
Education (‘Bijdrageregeling Vakopleiding Leerlingwezen’ BVL). The BVL subsidy was abandoned in favour 
of the WVA in 1995 due to the limited budget which meant that not all companies could be reached (Jacobs, 
2004). 
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 The scheme is flexible from a policy point of view. Over the years different types of 
training schemes have been added or removed from the scope of funding. This has 
allowed the WVA to be adapted according to the labour market situation, employer 
demand and forecasts of skills needs. 
 The number of accredited training companies has increased and the general awareness 
and attitude of employers towards investments in training has changed in a positive 
way. 
The following drawbacks can be noted: 
 There are high levels of reported deadweight. The majority of the employers interviewed 
for the evaluation period 2000-2006 report would have provided an apprenticeship place 
without making use of the WVA. 
 Unintended or ineligible use of the WVA was observed between 2006 and 2011. 
However, it is not possible to estimate its full extent or its consequences as there is little 
monitoring of claims. 
 No further quality criteria have been introduced into the scheme to guarantee that the 
training followed is eligible and adds value to the level of skills or education of the 
worker. 
 Interviews with the tax authority showed that control over the tax credit has been difficult 
and time intensive due to the complexity of the training and education market. 
 No studies have been undertaken to assess the impact of the WVA and the benefits for 
employees undertaking the training. In an analysis of a similar tax credit scheme aimed 
only at the over 40s, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) found no impact on wages for 
workers in this group that participated in training. 
Lessons from the Netherlands 
Of the three co-funding models reviewed in detail, the Dutch WVA system is the most 
general and administratively efficient. The main implications for co-funding in England are: 
 Increasing employer awareness of investing in training. The tax credit is associated with 
increased number of accredited training enterprises and may have increased 
awareness of the benefits of training. The provision of the tax credits has become a tool 
for employers to determine the general training plan for the company. Though this has 
not however necessarily increased the incidence of training, the tax credits may have 
helped to maintain levels of investment in training during the economic crisis. 
 Keeping the administration light. The administrative burden for employers has been kept 
to a minimum as requests for tax credits can be made directly via the payroll system 
and no further application documents need to be provided to the tax authority. A few 
documents however need to be retained by the employer for ex-post controls.  
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 Policy design needs to consider the potential for monitoring and controls. A strict 
definition of the costs that are eligible under the tax credit and a mechanism to monitor 
these is required to help the Exchequer administer the tax incentive. Ex-post controls by 
the tax authorities have also proved quite costly and time consuming. This has been 
heightened by the frequent changes in the scope of eligibility for certain types of 
training.  
 The delivery method can impact on perceptions of the rationale of the funding. Funding 
via lump-sum payments on payroll means that the tax incentive is effectively seen as a 
form of wage subsidy. However the WVA was not intended to be a wage subsidy, but 
rather an incentive for companies to support accredited training of their employees.  
 The availability of alternative funding routes and the potential for duplication. The 
availability of incentives for the same trainee/apprentice from alternative sources such 
as sector training funds makes it difficult to isolate the impact of the tax incentives. The 
potential for interactions and overlaps between different sources of funding need to be 
taken into account. 
 Open eligibility criteria compounded the lack of a cap on expenditure. The absence of a 
mechanism in place to cap expenditure has led to spiralling costs for the Exchequer. 
This has been compounded by the openness of the eligibility criteria.  
3.3 Case study conclusions 
This section has focused on three co-funded programmes: 
 Australia Apprenticeship Incentive Programme – a direct grant payment; 
 Skillsnet and National Training Fund (Ireland) – a network based levy-access scheme; 
 Payment reduction for education (Netherlands) – a lump sum, wastable tax credit.  
None of the identified co-funding models are identical to the type of co-funding model that 
could be deduced from recent reviews and policy statements, for example, the Richard 
Review and the Government’s response to it. However, in keeping with such intentions, all 
are aimed at increasing employer investment in appropriate and high quality FE and skills 
training in order to increase workplace productivity and thereby international 
competitiveness. 
The evidence from the three case studies on what works well, and less well, is 
summarised in Table 9 below. 
89 
Final Report: International Evidence Review on Co-funding for Training 
 
Table 9: A comparative assessment of impacts and what works 
 Australia  Ireland  Netherlands  
The costs of 
administration 
Administratively 
complex system. 
Group training and 
intermediary agencies 
to reduce employer 
burden. 
Network and dedicated 
State support relieve 
the burden on 
employers. The payroll 
levy presents a 
minimal administrative 
burden. 
Use of existing tax 
system supports 
administrative 
efficiency. Monitoring 
and auditing are 
however timely and 
costly. 
Employer ‘buy-
in’ 
High levels of reported 
satisfaction with 
training. 
Positive experiences of 
training reinforce 
employer ‘buy-in’ 
particularly among 
SMEs. 
Increased awareness 
of investing in training. 
Increased numbers of 
employers that are 
accredited as training 
providers. 
Take-up and 
investment in 
training 
Positive take-up of 
training, particularly 
shorter traineeships. 
Greater willingness to 
train and pay for 
training. 
Increased take-up of 
training, particularly 
work-based learning 
pathways. 
Completion of 
training 
Limited impact due to 
non-financial factors. 
High rates of 
completion. 
Not monitored. No 
evidence of impact. 
Equity of 
provision 
Limited impact. Equity 
concerns are instead 
affected by learner-
routed incentives. 
Training aimed at 
jobseekers and part 
time workers. 
Not monitored. No 
evidence of impact.  
Quality of 
provision 
Competition is 
impeded by high entry 
costs for newcomers 
and the dominance of 
established providers. 
Tailored courses, 
delivered according to 
specified needs. 
Lack of controls and 
checks on the quality 
of provision. 
 
The main conclusions drawn from the three case studies are that: 
 Financial incentives are but one of a variety of tools aimed at increasing employer 
investment in training and cannot be treated in isolation. The size of the incentives and 
costs of training are important factors in employer decision making along with quality 
and norms. However, the influence of each of these variables varies for different 
employers and points in time. Higher levels of incentives or support are necessary to 
attract employers who do not normally invest on training, especially SMEs. 
 There are a range of mechanisms available with associated trade-offs in their strengths 
and limitations. These are often the result of trade-offs between particular aims and 
objectives as the administrative burden is a natural consequence of stricter quality 
controls or increased levels of targeting. Loose eligibility criteria have the benefit of 
90 
Final Report: International Evidence Review on Co-funding for Training 
 
making the incentive accessible to businesses but the disadvantage of not promoting 
improvements in the quality of training or training completion rates.  
 Systems with greater controls in place and higher administrative burden are associated 
with more prudent, relevant and higher quality training. The more that incentives are 
targeted at specific sectors, occupations, individuals, skills, types and levels of training 
the greater are the monitoring requirements in order to ensure that the aims and 
objectives are met.  
 Employer ‘buy-in’ has an important influence on the amount, responsiveness and 
relevance of training, irrespective of the design of the co-funding model. It is important 
that employers are involved in the design and administration of the programme. This 
can however be achieved through a variety of mechanisms and with differing levels of 
employer engagement. 
 Government support and employer-routed financial incentives are associated with 
higher levels of take up of training in all three cases but there is also evidence of 
deadweight and displacement effects. The issue is not that deadweight occurs but that 
the level and nature of deadweight is acceptable and this is a political decision (BIS, 
2012c, p. 12). Displacement effects tend to occur as a result of the conditions of finance 
that establish which types of training and individual are eligible.  
 Providing employers with, albeit limited and partial, purchasing power is not sufficient to 
achieve high quality training provision. Further controls on the supply side are also 
necessary. Attempts to create a responsive market of training provision driven by 
employer demand have tended to drive down the costs of provision but, in the absence 
of sufficient monitoring and control, this is often at the expense of quality. 
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4 Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the evidence relevant to the research aims 
described in section 1.1. It also provides implications to consider when 
designing a policy of co-funding to increase employer investment in 
skills-oriented training. 
4.1 Summary of available evidence 
Governments around the world recognise the need to promote employer co-investment in 
training and employ a wide range of instruments to this end. However, the lack of robust 
empirical evidence on the impacts of co-financing schemes on training and the wider skills 
system means that any recommendations must be formulated with caution.  
The variety of tax expenditures, subsidies and levy-grant mechanisms examined are 
fundamentally similar, insofar as they route government funding through employers and 
thereby seek to increase employer investment in training, and the relevance and quality of 
training. The extent to which their effects on training outcomes differ is more often guided 
by the context in which they are delivered and the detail of the specific conditions 
attached. Consideration of the wider issues of employer perceptions on the benefits of 
training and supply side conditions are also needed - factors which are likely to differ on a 
sector-by-sector, or even a firm-by-firm and individual basis. 
Evidence on the effectiveness of co-funding arrangements are by no means conclusive 
and even a more detailed analysis of three specific cases provides only notional guidance 
and lessons to think about in considering the approach to funding in England (see section 
4.2).  
With these limitations and caveats in mind, the high level findings from the evidence 
review are that: 
 The economic cycle, institutional and personal factors have a stronger influence than 
financial incentives on the take-up and completion of training. Fiscal incentives are more 
likely to impact on employers who already invest in training.  
 Increasing the investment in training of employers who rarely or never invest in skills 
training is unlikely to come from financial incentives but rather from communicating or 
demonstrating the returns on investment in training. Experts suggest that firms are also 
more likely to invest in training, the more that they are involved in decisions about its 
design and delivery. 
 Attempts to target incentives necessarily increase the administrative costs as such 
schemes need to be managed and monitored more closely. However, allowing freedom 
as to which types of employers receive public funding and what type of training is 
supported may not be in line with Government priorities. 
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4.2 Lessons for policy implementation from abroad 
The key lessons emerging from this review of the design and delivery of co-funding 
instruments are presented below. 
Influencing employer decisions 
The emphasis of the research evidence presented in the paper suggests that a perceived 
focus only on the costs and funding mechanism for training is insufficient. Instead there is 
a need to place greater emphasis on the benefits of training, and consider the full range of 
mechanisms to encourage more employers to invest in high quality training for more of 
their workers. In order to overcome attitudes and habits that are less favourable towards 
investment in training, incentives should not be implemented in isolation. Instead greater 
account of motivations to train and other non-financial barriers to training should also be 
addressed. To reflect the differentiated attitudes to training, concerted efforts should be 
taken to develop understanding of where the benefits for training lie and communicate the 
benefits of training to the actors concerned.  
The administrative burden 
There are a range of mechanisms available with associated trade-offs in their strengths 
and limitations. These are often the result of trade-offs between particular aims and 
objectives as the administrative burden is a natural consequence of stricter quality controls 
or increased levels of targeting. Loose eligibility criteria have the benefit of making the 
incentive accessible to businesses but the disadvantage of not promoting improvements in 
the quality of training or training completion rates. Broadly speaking, the more that quality 
controls or targeting is desired or considered necessary, the less it is appropriate to use 
the tax system to deliver employer-routed co-funding in training.  
The analysis has identified several possible ways to minimise or offset the administrative 
burden on employers: 
 The use of existing tax infrastructure to raise or distribute funds can relieve the 
employer of additional costs in compliance that a new system may bring. This assumes 
that levels of tax compliance are high and that employers largely understand the tax 
system. Further support and communication may however be required. The efficient use 
of the tax system is also conditional on the ability of the tax system to control and 
sufficiently monitor compliance. It may only be suitable in the case of training that is 
easy to verify. Based on the experience in the Netherlands, this approach may result in 
displacement effects between different types of training on the basis of the timeliness 
and ease of verification. 
 Given the difficulty and cost for tax authorities to carry out ex-post controls, it may be 
necessary for a specialist funding agency to assess the eligibility or validity of any 
claims. Industry and locally-oriented support mechanisms can also be useful to support 
firms in submitting claims for government funding.  
 Staged payments may be used to establish timely compliance of firms but would need 
to be sufficiently large to influence the likelihood of completion, which are driven by 
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other economic, institutional, social and personal factors. Where support is output 
oriented, employers may factor in the risks of non-completion that are beyond their 
control. 
 The costs of administering a network-based system or competitive training fund are 
relatively high. The experience of Skillnets in Ireland and the AAIP in Australia suggest 
that the burden can be shifted away from employers and onto specialist agencies. By 
designating a limited amount or proportion of funding to the management of a training 
network in Ireland, a dedicated government agency and individual network managers 
act as intermediaries between employers, the network and external providers. A critical 
condition for the success of such an approach is the degree of employer ‘buy-in’.  
Employer ‘buy-in’ 
In all cases, the financial incentives for employer investment in training cannot be isolated 
from the wider topography of skills policies and programmes. Co-funding models are but 
one of a variety of instruments aimed at increasing employer investment in training and 
cannot be treated in isolation.  
Whichever delivery mechanism is adopted, employer ‘buy-in’ is vital. The acceptance for a 
given scheme and the corresponding willingness to invest time and money in it has an 
important influence on the amount, responsiveness and relevance of training, irrespective 
of the design of the co-funding model. Employer ‘buy-in’ may be developed based on 
positive experiences and perceptions of training. This is particularly necessary in order that 
the introduction of a price (more direct and tangible costs) does not deter investment in 
training. Those employers with negative or no experience of training will most likely be 
deterred by the higher costs. Experience in Ireland suggests that social partner 
involvement can help to generate and maintain employer ‘buy-in’. In particular, the 
Skillnets approach supports firms in analysing training needs, developing training plans or 
budgets and in communicating these needs to providers. Such support is likely to be 
particularly important with employers or sectors that have limited experience of training or 
rapidly emerging training needs. 
While this report considers only the direct costs of training, experience in Australia 
highlights that the costs (and availability) of supervision, and other indirect costs 
associated with training may present barriers to smaller firms in particular. Some countries, 
including Ireland and Australia, reduce these costs by introducing intermediary bodies to 
take care of the administrative duties involved in procuring and organising training. These 
bodies may also be responsible for routing government funding into employer hands or 
selecting potential trainees to suit the needs of employers. Such bodies can play a 
particularly important role for SMEs and often focus on a particular industry, or a particular 
region.  
Networks or group training is also often used so that firms can pool resources and share 
the burden of the costs of training. These networks can also facilitate greater employer 
involvement in the design and administration of the co-funding instrument which is seen to 
be associated with a corresponding greater willingness to train in all cases.  
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Finally, employer ‘buy-in’ is likely to be limited in the case of a co-funding model that is 
based on punitive measures such as levy-exemption schemes. The imposition of a 
compulsory universal levy or tax on employers to finance training is also likely to be met 
with resistance. The experience of the National Training Fund in Ireland suggests that a 
compulsory levy arrangement need not however be intrusive. Here, the introduction of a 
training levy on payroll led to no net change in tax requirements. This presents a minimal 
administrative burden of collecting the levy and helped to ensure a smooth path to its 
introduction. This approach however has contributed to limited awareness of the levy 
contribution among employers. 
Co-funding mechanisms, such as the Skillnets model in Ireland, that support the 
development of training plans and include an active role for different stakeholders may 
lead to improved attitudes towards training through peer-learning or network effects. 
Involvement of stakeholders, including employer representatives and trade unions at 
industry or local level, can also help to generate and maintain employer and industry ‘buy-
in’. Such support is likely to be particularly important with employers or sectors that have 
limited experience of training. 
The added value of government funding 
Employer-routed co-funding systems do increase participation in training but there are 
always associated deadweight effects. The issue is not that deadweight occurs but that the 
level and nature of deadweight is acceptable. The level of deadweight considered 
acceptable is a political decision (BIS, 2012c, p. 12). A more pragmatic approach suggests 
that it may be a case of looking to leverage ‘qualitative additionality’. That is to say that the 
Government contribution should look to increase uptake of higher quality training activities 
in which industries or firms would otherwise have under-invested (and which accrue 
positive economic and social outcomes).  
To encourage employers to increase investment in quality training, a primary concern 
should be to overcome the barriers to training and make it easier for employers to engage. 
From a supply side perspective, sufficient control mechanisms are also needed to 
guarantee the quality of training delivered in companies and training centres. These are 
however unlikely to affect non-training firms’ decision to train. 
Reform to the English co-funding model, may also seek to address equity concerns that 
arise as a result of the observed ‘Matthew Effect’ – whereby firms invest more in training 
for the highly qualified employees. In several cases, the government contribution to 
financing of skill needs is directly linked to particular groups or made conditional on a 
certain proportion of the training activities being linked to more basic forms of entry-level or 
low level skills training. Given the high levels of associated administrative burden in 
monitoring, the employer-routed funding does not appear to be the most effective way of 
targeting training among the low-qualified or disadvantaged groups of individuals. Instead 
a wider package of individual incentives, rights and support mechanisms would be 
needed. 
The quality and responsiveness of provision 
Although the three case studies only place a partial amount of purchasing power in the 
hands of employers, the balance of evidence suggests that this is insufficient to deliver 
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quality and responsive training on its own. Attempts to create a responsive market of 
training provision based on employer demand in Australia have tended to drive down the 
costs of provision but often at the expense of quality. 
The role of price can also not be disassociated from the quality of provision and social 
‘norms’ or training habits. Since these variables tend to differ amongst groups of 
employers, substitution effects are a typical consequence of any co-funding reform. 
However, the influence of each of these variables varies for different employers and points 
in time and the outcomes can be difficult to assess ex ante.  
4.3 Policy considerations in an English setting 
The preceding analysis has highlighted a number of lessons for implementation based on 
the observed interactions between different co-funding models and the wider skills system.  
 Whichever delivery model is adopted, employer ‘buy-in’ is important to the amount, 
responsiveness and relevance of training. It is important that employers are involved in 
the design and administration of the programme. As explored above, this can be 
achieved through a variety of mechanisms and differing levels of employer engagement. 
In order to make effective decisions, employers need however to be aware of competing 
training offers and able to easily compare their strengths and weaknesses 
 Employer ownership is widely perceived as having had a positive impact on the quality 
of training and relevance to employer and industry needs in terms of content and 
delivery in Ireland. This finding is conditional on at least two key factors. From the 
demand side, it is necessary that employers are aware of what their collective short- 
and long-term needs are and able to communicate or signal these to providers. It also 
requires providers and experienced trainers that are able to adapt their offers and 
respond to employer needs.  
 In Australia, demand-led and employer-routed funding is however seen as insufficient to 
generate true competition in the market for training provision. In particular, the high 
costs of market entry for providers, including the high fixed costs of specialist equipment 
and technologies for training, may deter (or delay) them from responding to employer 
demand.  
 The role of the provider infrastructure on the impact of various incentives has not been 
explored by the literature but may have a significant impact. Models in which spending 
power is concentrated in the hands of employers report high levels of satisfaction in the 
quality and relevance of training. These however tend to be relatively small and focused 
schemes and may not be scalable. 
 Any substantial shift in funding away from providers and into employer hands may also 
limit the development of new training without additional support. Since for providers 
there is effectively ‘nothing to sell’ during the set-up phase of a new course. In Ireland, 
the introduction of a dedicated funding stream to support the design of new courses 
seeks to curtail such a development. With any reform to the English model of co-
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funding, it will be desirable to monitor and ensure that the college and training provider 
network is not destabilised by any changes in the routing of funding. 
 While staged payments may be a useful tool to ensure timely compliance and 
completion, upfront support is also necessary. In particular, experts in Ireland suggest 
that the upfront support is necessary to support employer engagement in the design of 
training. Some firms may also require further upfront support as they may struggle to 
finance training at market value due to cash-flow issues in the current economic climate. 
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Appendix 1: Review protocol 
The review protocol set out a detailed understanding of the goals and scope of the 
evidence review identified the questions to be explored the sources that are expected to 
provide material for the review. The protocol, presented below, essentially consisted of a 
detailed methodology for the literature review, including the approach towards the 
identification, extraction and interpretative analysis of information on co-funding 
instruments and evidence of their impact. 
The literature review followed eight key steps:  
1. Detailed analytical research questions were defined to narrow the scope.  
2. A pre-defined search strategy and inclusion criteria was established, to conduct 
database searches using combinations of keywords in English, French, Dutch, 
German, Italian and Spanish languages. 
3. Key inputs of English-language references provided by BIS were collated. 
4. Complementary web-based searching, use of the ‘snowballing’ technique, and the 
targeting of evaluative assessments of identified co-funding schemes sought to fill 
gaps in the evidence base. 
5. Consultations with known experts in the research field were conducted to identify 
emergent research material and establish their viewpoints on key issues. 
6. Quality assurance techniques were employed, ensuring that the emphasis of the 
review was placed on high quality research, including peer review by 4 external 
experts. 
7. Data was extracted according to a template derived from the key analytical 
questions. 
8.  A synthesis of key findings from the available evidence was developed.  
The Review Protocol 
Specific review questions 
The aim of the international review was to establish the underlying evidence base for 
employer-focused co-funding approaches in order to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. What delivery models are used for co-funding (e.g. grant, levy, tax system)? 
2. What types of businesses/employees are targeted? 
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3. What types of training / skills are targeted (e.g. basic, higher level and 
management skills)? 
4. What are the impacts on the overall take-up, incidence and quality of training? 
Does this vary by the nature of the intervention or businesses/training targeted? 
5. What is the nature of impacts (short- and long-term) of the training supported (e.g. 
productivity gains, reductions in low skill levels, etc.)? 
6. Are the co-funding policies cost-effective? Does this vary by the nature of the 
support or businesses/training targeted? 
7. Are there any deadweight effects, if so, what are their size and nature? 
8. Are there any substitution effects or other unintended consequences?  
9. How does the level of awareness of co-funding policies affect the take-up rate of 
incentives and the amount of work-related training? 
10. What are the gross and net revenue effects of a co-funding policy incentive? 
In short, the research team sought to explore the targets and underlying rationale of the 
various instruments and models of co-funding and evaluate their efficiency and 
effectiveness on the basis of the evidence presented. This research was guided by the 
underpinning logic model illustrated in Figure 8 below. 
Figure 8: Intervention Logic 
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 The rationale and problem areas are discussed in section 1.2; 
 The funding instruments and delivery mechanisms are explored in sections 2.2 and 2.3; 
 Evidence on training outputs is examined in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2; and 
 Evidence on outcomes and impacts is presented in section 2.4.3. 
The logic model in Figure 8 above also guided the structure of the case study analysis 
presented in chapter 3. 
Given the range of review questions and wide scope of co-funding mechanisms under 
examination, the search strategy followed a pragmatic and iterative process.  
Given the anticipated dearth of robust, peer-reviewed evidence available on the theme, the 
review sought to draw not only on peer-reviewed journal articles, but also on non-peer 
reviewed academic research, government commissioned research, evaluations and other 
forms of grey literature.  
Inclusion parameters and database searches 
The defining parameters set out in Box 9 below were established to ensure inclusion of a 
wide range of sources and perspectives in the literature in order for the reviewers to 
examine the evaluative evidence of international approaches to foster employer 
investment in training. 
In an iterative process, as the review and literature search progresses, the emerging 
evidence was mapped against the identified research propositions, in order to identify 
gaps, and better target and refine searches. In order to uncover articles to fill evidence 
gaps that might otherwise not be found, reviewers employed the ‘snowballing’ technique, 
in which the reviewer is pointed in the direction of potentially informative work from the 
references section of work under review.  
Further, we chose not to employ strict quality criteria in the initial selection process. 
Typically, these might include assessments of theory robustness, methodology, 
generalisability, contribution etc. Instead, we did not to exclude a priori contributory work 
from practitioner and policy communities whose ‘quality’ might be determined by different 
criteria, and which might provide more practical insights. It was therefore considered 
important to review the outputs of relevant government research and commissioned 
projects. 
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Box 9: Search strategy and inclusion parameters for identifying literature 
Historical antecedents 
The study, while not being specifically constrained by any particular dates, focused 
on recent literature since 2001, due to the desire to capture the under-pinning 
evidence base for existing tax incentive and co-funding mechanisms. Seminal papers 
were also included, since their findings should still be robust. 
Language and geographic scope 
International experiences to inform the review, with focus on countries/States at 
similar levels of development to England. Database searches to be conducted in 
English, Dutch, French, German, Italian and Spanish, with sources in other major 
European and Asian languages to be included in the review where these are 
identified. Emphasis to be placed on non-English sources in order to build on existing 
evidence base. 
Types of incentive and co-funding model 
Includes all schemes that seek to incentivise employer co-funding through voluntary 
or compulsory measures, including but not exclusively those which use the tax 
system for delivery. 
Populations 
All sectors and occupations, the full population of firms (large companies and SMEs), 
and the training of both new and existing staff are within scope. 
Specified key words 
Key words will be developed to reflect the review questions specified and the full 
range of types of initiative and programme within scope. Boolean terms will be used. 
Indications of possible key word combinations are: 
 “co-financ*” OR “co-fund*” OR “firm-sponsored” OR “employer fund*” OR 
 “incentive” OR “tax” OR “levy” OR “subsidy” AND: 
 “vocational training” OR “work based learning”; OR “apprenticeship” OR 
“traineeship” OR “further education”; OR “skills” AND 
 “programme evaluation”; “project evaluation”; “policy evaluation” OR 
 “uptake”; “efficiency”; “cost effectiveness”; “access”; “benefits”. 
Literature sources 
 Desk-based search of EBSCO Host databases, including EconLit with full text, 
and RePEc, to identify peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters and non-
peer reviewed academic research 
 Cedefop’s bibliographic database, VET-Bib considered the most accurate tool for 
supporting evidenced based policy making in the field of VET in Europe. This 
source includes a dynamic bibliography devoted to the theme of “Improving 
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Box 9: Search strategy and inclusion parameters for identifying literature 
efficiency, quality and levels of VET funding” 
 National level research can be identified by consulting the work of key research 
centres such as the OECD, the Centre for the Development of Professional 
Training (Centre INFFO) based in France, the Federal Institute for Vocational 
Education and Training (BIBB) based in Germany, the Korea Research Institute 
for Vocational Education and Training (KRIVET), National Centre for Vocational 
Education Research (NCVER) based in Australia, and other national VET 
centres. 
 Grey literature of international sources identified by the ICF GHK team and from 
previous BIS research and cross-government material is also incorporated into 
the evidence review to ensure the review builds on, rather than duplicates, the 
existing evidence base. 
Consultation 
Stakeholder consultations will fulfil two key purposes: to provide further review 
material (e.g. grey literature), and offer verbal and expert evidence, assessment and 
viewpoints on the key issues related to the review questions. 
 
Data Extraction Template 
For the recording of content from the literature, the research team made use of a ‘data 
extraction’ template common to each study, which sets a number of categories derived 
from the specific review questions. This approach guided readers to focus content on the 
review questions and issues of relevance for appraisal of the evidence, while the use of a 
common template reduced inconsistencies and improved validity and reliability.  
The data extraction template was piloted to ensure that it worked effectively to facilitate 
analysis of both academic and grey literature sources – and enabled evidence gaps to be 
identified early and for continual identification of the sub-group of literature to form the 
basis of case study material. A database was created that summarises each study 
according to the criteria shown in Box 10 below. 
Bibliographic information, as well as notes on the purpose and focus of the study under 
review was extracted based on an initial scan of study abstracts and executive summaries. 
A more detailed reading of the identified sources then sought to identify the evidence 
associating the programme or incentive mechanism with different benefits or successful 
outcomes and impacts. 
To inform the comparative assessment of the available evidence, the reviewer also 
extracted information on the methodology used, the main results of the study in terms of 
impact, as well as any policy recommendations therein. 
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 Box 10: Data extraction template 
Reference  
Reference No. 
Author, Year 
Study Title 
Journal / Institution 
Peer Reviewed (Yes/No) 
Study purpose 
Purpose 
Geographic Scope 
Other scope (firms, sectors, levels of 
learning, types of training) 
Type(s) of co-funding model 
Review of Methodology  
Methodology (RCT, Empirical, Survey, 
Literature, Review, Case studies, etc.) 
Sample size and appropriateness  
Analysis and assessment of impact 
(Yes/No) 
How impact measured e.g. per cent of 
employers or employees 
Analysis and assessment of unintended 
consequences (Yes/ No) 
Analysis of comparative approaches – 
cross-country (Yes/ No) 
The impact of co-funding models on: 
Quantity of training (incidence, duration) 
Quality of training (accreditation) 
Employer engagement in training 
Responsiveness of training to skills needs 
Provider and delivery infrastructure 
Efficiency of allocation of funding 
Access to training for specific groups of 
firms (firm size, industry sector etc.) 
Access to training for specific groups of 
individuals (age, gender, schooling etc.) 
Public revenue 
Employer benefits  
Details on co-funding model 
Scheme type 
Aims and objectives of instrument 
Type of training targeted 
Timescale 
Main provisions 
Restrictions 
Evidence sources (link to supporting 
data via reference numbers) 
Assessment of information (based on 
level of available evidence) 
Quality assessment  
Counterfactual evidence 
Statistical robustness of evidence 
Evidence of bias 
Use of study in data synthesis (Y/N) 
Reason for non-inclusion 
Role in synthesis (context, evidence base, 
case study) 
 
Quality assessment 
Upon completion of the analysis, the research team undertook a comparative quality 
assessment of each study, again using the criteria established as part of the review 
protocol. The relative robustness of each study was identified. Where, uncertainties on 
particular studies exist, the peer review group of technical experts was asked for specific 
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comment. This quality assessment involved consideration of the strength of evidence, 
explores whether any observed effects are consistent across studies, and investigated 
possible reasons for any inconsistencies. 
The quality assessment process was also supported by the expertise of the peer review 
team where uncertainty over significance and robustness was encountered. Studies 
judged to be of relatively poorer quality were not necessarily discounted; rather their 
limitations were made clear. 
Detailed results 
The review protocol led to identification of: 
 89 publications addressing the research propositions, of which 63 were judged to be 
within the scope of the study; 
 40 international examples of co-funding schemes; and 
 A total of 9 consultations with academic, research and policy experts able to offer 
further insight into the key issues related to the review questions. 
Sources include international reviews by the European Commission, Cedefop, World Bank 
and the OECD, Government and departmental reviews, programme-level evaluations, 
court of auditors’ reports, academic articles, research working papers, conference papers, 
and briefings. 
Given the wide range of research questions under investigation, the review does not 
reflect exhaustive coverage of the international literature. Instead, the systematic review 
was undertaken with pragmatic considerations in mind, in order to inform the policy 
reforms of FE and training finance in England as well as the development of robust and 
credible case study assessments. 
List of external experts consulted 
The following experts on training finance were consulted through semi-structured 
telephone interviews. These consultations sought to identify relevant evidence sources 
and draw in further insights regarding the context of co-funding and the use of tax 
incentives to encourage employer investment in training.  
Prof. Giorgio Brunello, University of Padova, Italy 
Dr. Dieter Dohmen, Institute for Education and Socio-Economic Research and Consulting 
(FiBS), Germany 
Patrycja Lipińska, European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) 
Kathryn Hoeckel, Harvard Graduate School of Education and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Peter Szovics, Institute of Banking Education, Slovakia 
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Sue Fergusson, National Centre for Vocational Education Research, Australia 
Anonymous Experts on International Tax Policy and Administration 
Anonymous Expert on International Training Finance 
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Appendix 2: Case study selection 
method 
Based on the evidence review, data on the main provisions, eligibility requirements and 
restrictions and findings from evaluative assessments of the co-funding programmes and 
policies presented was extracted. This process generated a dynamic shortlist of 40 case 
studies from which we assessed the case studies against the selection criteria noted 
below, and drew recommendations on the final case studies to be investigated. 
Three schemes were then selected in order to identify the advantages and disadvantages 
of different approaches co-funding and draw lessons for the development and delivery of 
an English model of employer routed co-funding. The methodology for case study 
selection, presented below, includes details on the operationalisation of qualitative 
assessment criteria. 
Case study selection 
By combining the evidence from the literature review with the dynamic shortlist, the 
research team established the degree to which evaluative information is available for the 
different schemes. This enabled a preliminary assessment of the relative efficiency, 
effectiveness, relevance and replicability of the international co-funding measures. 
The rationale for selecting case studies was based on five criteria, of which a key guiding 
factor was the need to draw lessons for the renewal of the English model of co-funding.  
Criteria Description 
Relevance Where the co-funding models are intended to encourage 
employers to invest in training, and the rationale for 
development is in line with priorities for further education 
funding reform in England 
Replicability Can co-funding arrangements be taken as a model and 
applied to the English context 
Efficiency Does the evidence point to an efficient allocation of funding 
and low costs on the Exchequer 
Effectiveness Does the evidence point to net benefits for learners, 
employers, and the wider FE and skills system 
Information Where there is available, clear and well documented 
evidence of the co-funding model 
 
Information and relevance were considered the most important criteria, and the 
assessment was weighted towards these criteria accordingly. This serves to ensure that 
case studies were selected based on the best available evidence, and on those 
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considered to be the most relevant to apprenticeship funding reform. Detailed information 
on how these criteria were operationalised is provided below.  
Relevance 
While all of the identified incentive and co-funding models identified were within scope, 
case studies bearing relevance to the English priorities of funding reforms in 
apprenticeships via tax and subsidy systems were considered most highly relevant from 
an English policy perspective. Given that there is essentially a voluntary system of 
employer engagement in training in England, universal levy arrangements based on 
compulsory contributions collected via taxes on payroll or channelled through various 
industry organisations were considered to be less relevant. Reflecting the principles of 
reform of the English model, the assessment of relevance considered two broad 
dimensions. Firstly, relevant models were those that allow for employer choice in training 
decisions and promote employer engagement. Secondly, relevant models were those 
systems in which there is employer investment in the direct costs of training.   
A further key consideration was also the timescale of the co-funding model: here, expired 
policies and newly implemented policies are considered less relevant, on the basis of a 
need to consult informed policymakers and stakeholders who can readily relate to our lines 
of questioning. 
Replicability 
Given the focused nature of many incentive systems, one criterion for replicability was the 
co-funding and tax regimes that incentivise education and training in-line with the UK 
Government’s skills priorities. Another policy priority is hard to reach individuals and 
employers, such as SMEs. There is a virtuous circle of learning whereby training begets 
more training, and incentives that break people and firms into this virtuous circle were 
prioritised. Therefore, it was considered appropriate to include as case studies those co-
funding and tax incentives which stimulate investment in skills in these areas. 
For each case study, an assessment of replicability considered a number of factors 
associated with the identified co-funding incentives including: 
 the type of co-funding model;  
 geographic coverage;  
 the targeting of specific sectors, occupations and levels of learning;  
 agents and actors involved in realising the training outcomes;  
 its position in the broader skills system, such as, the provider infrastructure;  
 relationship to employment and tax legislation more generally; and  
 the compatibility with the key principles guiding UK FE and skills training reform. 
Effectiveness 
The case studies sought to focus on approaches that work. They must have met their aims 
and strategic objectives without significant levels of deadweight, substitution or other 
intended consequences. How well the programme fit into the strategic, institutional and 
operational context was also considered. The assessment did not however unconditionally 
preclude programmes which have failed to realise operational targets, since these may be 
afflicted by optimism bias or the so-called planning fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
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The additionality of an intervention was also considered particularly important. This served 
to avoid a focus on incentives that have been effective in raising levels of training amongst 
certain target groups at the expense of training amongst other groups. 
Efficiency 
The case studies prioritised support and incentives that are cost effective. Though due to 
data limitations no strict definition of what constitutes ‘cost effective’ was adopted, the 
financial efficiency (cost effectiveness) of particular incentives was assessed by the extent 
to which they deliver the desired outcomes and at what cost. Accordingly, those incentives 
that the analysis revealed to be ineffective were excluded from the efficiency assessment 
altogether (along with those which are unable to be tested due to lack of information), 
while those incentives that did appear to be effective are assessed in terms of their cost 
per additional commencement or cost per additional completion, where such information 
was available. In the absence of such information, based on the literature review, we were 
able to at least provide a ranking of the value added of different approaches. 
Information 
The operationalisation of the criteria above required information to assess their relevance, 
replicability, effectiveness and efficiency. We were unable to compare the additionality, 
deadweight and displacement of different approaches where such information is lacking.  
In addition, given the reliance of the review on secondary evidence, the more evaluative 
information sources there were about a given co-funding programme or incentive scheme, 
the more informative the case study was assessed to be. Reliance on a single evidence 
source for evidence was considered to be problematic, particularly where this may have 
been subject to bias and had not undergone peer review. 
Case study assessment 
The criteria were assigned a value of high, medium/high, medium or medium/low or low. In 
turn the values assigned by the case study researchers were translated into a 
corresponding three-point scale (0-2) to limit the risk of subjectivity in the individual 
assessments from influencing case study selection and detailed follow-up. 
The application of the information assessment restricted the shortlist to 18 studies. 
Sufficient evidence and evaluative material on which to make an assessment was 
unavailable for 22 of the 40 schemes. A further 5 cases were excluded as they expired 
more than 10 years ago. France’s three levy systems have also been combined in the 
outputs of the assessment, summarised in Table 10 below.  
Within countries, there are often a number of different levers and measures used to 
promote employer investment in training. In France, for example, there are number of 
disparate levies, tax incentives and contractual obligations which all interplay within a 
wider system. In such cases, it is often not possible to consider the impacts of any one 
component in isolation. Several such cases were therefore considered as a group. 
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Table 10: Case study assessment 
Country Delivery 
Mechanism 
Scheme Name Information Relevance+ 
(Choice) 
Relevance+ 
(Finance) 
Effectiveness Efficiency Replicability Score* 
Australia 
Direct 
subsidy 
Australian Apprenticeship 
Initiative Program (AAIP) 
1.5 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 9
Austria Tax credit Apprentice tax credit 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 0 5
Denmark 
Direct subsidy
& levy-access 
 Employers’ trainee 
reimbursement 
0.5 1 2 0.5 0 0 7.5
France Various levies Levy funds; train-or-pay 1 0.5 1.5 0 0.5 0 6.5
France Tax credit Apprentice tax credit 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 5.5
Ireland Levy-access Skillnets 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 11
Korea Levy-grant Job Skill Development  0.5 0 1 1 1 0.5 5
Netherlands Levy-access Sectoral levy funds 1 0.5 1 0.5 0 1 6.5
Netherlands Tax credit 
Payment reduction for 
education (WVA) 
1.5 1 0.5 1 1 1 9
Netherlands Tax credit Deduction for over 40s 1.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 6
US (Iowa) 
Tax 
allowance  
New jobs training 0.5 1 0 1.5 1 1 6.5
Notes: * High = 2, Medium = 1, Low = 0. + Scores on information and relevance are double weighted. The three selected studies are 
highlighted in bold.
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Appendix 3: Comparative 
Classification of Qualifications 
The 2011 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) is mapped onto the 
equivalent qualifications in England, and the Qualifications and Credit Framework (QCF) in 
table 11 below. The mapping is indicative only. 
Table 11: Mapping of English qualifications onto ISCED 2011 
Qualification 
level 
ISCED 2011 level Equivalent qualifications 
in England 
QCF 
Level 
0 Pre-primary education Early Years Foundation Stage 
- 
1 Primary education Key Stage 1-2 Entry Low 
2 Lower secondary education GCSE, NVQ levels 1 and 2 
1-2 
3 Upper secondary education A-levels, NVQ level 3 
3 
Medium 
4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education Access courses (e.g. HNC) 
3 
5 Short-cycle tertiary education 
Foundation degrees and 
HND 
4-5 
6 Bachelor or equivalent Undergraduate degrees (e.g. BA, BSc) 
6 
7 Master or equivalent Postgraduate degrees (e.g. MA, MPhil, PGCE) 
7 
High 
8 Doctoral or equivalent Doctoral (e.g. PhD) 8 
 
Sources: developed by ICF GHK based on UNESCO (2012a and 2012b) and Ofqual (2012)
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